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ABSTRACT
Discovering true and meaningful communities in dark networks is a non-trivial 
yet useful task. Because terrorists work hard to hide their relationships/network, analysts 
have an incomplete picture of their strategy; even worse, the degree of incompleteness 
is unknown. To better protect our nation, analysts would benefit f r om a  t ool t hat helps 
them identify meaningful terrorist communities. This thesis introduces a general-purpose 
algorithm for community detection in multiplex dark networks using the layers of the 
network based on edge attributes. The methodology includes community detection details 
from each layer, yet it is still flexible enough to be meaningful in a variety of networks based 
on the user’s interest. The aim of this thesis is to build on current layer aggregation 
methodologies as well as preexisting community detection algorithms. We apply our 
algorithm to three multiplex terrorist networks: Noordin Top Network, Boko Haram and 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We validate our algorithm by 
measuring adjusted conductance and cluster adequacy with respect to community quality. 
We demonstrate the utility of our community partitions by developing a community guided 
network shortest path interdiction model, which disrupts the information flow in the Noordin 
Top Network.
v
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Executive Summary
Network science allows us to visualize large data sets in the form of a mathematical model.
Partitioning a network into communities based on its topology, helps reduce the complexity
of large networks by placing vertices into groups based on similar attributes. Detecting
communities in single layer networks is a well-studied problem. However, detecting com-
munities in multiplex networks that contain many layers is challenging. Network layer
aggregation approaches reduce a multiplex network to a single weighted graph, which sim-
plifies the network to a single layer community detection problem. However, aggregating
all of the layers causes the detailed information associated with each layer to be lost. A
new algorithm that detects communities in multiplex networks that reduces the cost of
information loss is needed.
This thesis proposes a purpose-driven community detection algorithm for multiplex net-
works that is user-engaged at multiple steps to develop analytically useful communities.
The algorithm focuses on a user-defined goal, which directs the algorithm to select and
combine layers appropriately in support of that goal. In addition, the user selects weights
and an information threshold that results in a spectrum of community numbers and sizes.
To test our algorithm, we used three dark network data sets from the NPS Common Op-
erational Research Environment Lab, with a user defined goal of network disruption. We
specifically tailored the algorithm to reduce the effects of incomplete information on dark
network analysis.
In total, we explored 81 subcases from our dark networks that included different weights
and information threshold choices. To determine community quality, we measured cluster
adequacy and average adjusted conductance of the resultant communities from each subcase.
The community quality generally increased with the size of the community. The larger
communities were developed under the provisions of the most relaxed threshold values.
However, we also observed that graph components that were identified as communities
resulted in perfect community quality scores regardless of the community size.
The main purpose of our community development was to disrupt a terrorist network. With
this goal in mind, we formulated a community guided shortest path interdiction network
flow model. Subcase 3.9 provided the necessary community compositions to guide the
xvii
shortest path interdiction model towards a faster solution. We recommend more trials
using other subcases to reveal the optimal community composition. However, subcase 3.9
demonstrated the utility of our communities to reduce the complexity of our network model
from 1196 to 698 edges. We believe there exists an optimal community composition for
each network, which depends on the associated community purpose as well as community
quality.
This thesis presented an alternativemethod for conducting community detection inmultiplex
networks. By analysing our resultant community properties, we enhanced current optimal
shortest path interdiction results. The community guided approach achieved similar optimal
results while significantly reducing solution time. Our focus on first defining a purpose for
community detection helped guide our algorithm development into a working procedure
with tangible results. We believe that detecting purpose-driven communities in multiplex
networks by thresholding user-engaged layer aggregation is a promising area of research
that should be continued and examined with more data sets in the future.
xviii
Acknowledgments
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of my family. My wife,
Lynsey, and daughter, Catherine, have been a constant source of strength throughout my
time here at the Naval Postgraduate School. My family has fostered an environment that
stimulates intellectual curiosity while still keeping me grounded in reality. The balance
between work and family is difficult to maintain, yet my family’s patience with me during
my graduate school time has been amazing. Lynsey and Catherine are truly a blessing, and
I’m looking forward to our next adventure together.
My advisor, Ralucca Gera, and my second readers, Matthew Carlyle, and Gerry Baum-
gartner, have guided me along this intellectual journey of discovery. Ralucca and Matthew
allowed me the opportunity to combine applied mathematical theory with operations re-
search application. Ralucca provided me with the mathematical foundation for this thesis
and constantly pushed me to question my own understanding of network science and to
keep searching for more knowledge. She has invested a lot of time in my development
as a researcher and a teacher. Matthew helped me develop a modeling application to test
the algorithm we developed for this thesis. His linear programming skills and network
flow modeling were essential to the success of this thesis. Discussions with Gerry and his
research team helped me view my research from a different perspective, fill in knowledge
gaps, and enhance the overall quality of this thesis.
Special thanks to Akrati Saxena for her exceptional Python coding skills and research
working group participation. She was instrumental in transforming our detection algorithm
into code and provided additional research papers on community detection for consideration.
Exchanging research ideas with her has been a rewarding experience that fosters the very
spirit of learning in an academic environment.
I would also like to thank Sean Everton and Daniel Cunningham for providing the three
dark network data sets. Without this data to test our algorithm, this thesis would have
remained strictly theoretical. Discussions with Sean also helped steer our metrics for
testing community quality and helped provide an intellectual sanity check on our community
detection algorithm.
xix
My journey to graduate school would not have been possible without the letters of rec-
ommendation from Richard Miksad, Jose Gomez, and Greg Phillips. I am tremendously
grateful for their collective confidence in me to excel at the graduate level.
Although not directly involved in my thesis, I’d like to thank the entire AppliedMathematics
and Operations Research Departments. My mathematical foundation, research skills, and
curiosity were molded and refined through all of the time each of my professors invested in
my education. My fellow classmates, Karoline Hood and Scott Warnke, invested countless
hours in studying and reviewing concepts with me to complete our class assignments and
grow in our knowledge together at NPS.
I would also like to thank Michelle Pagnani for the thesis writing workshops and reviewing
my writing. Her guidance helped me to become a better writer. The writing process is
challenging, and I could not have produced a coherent thesis without her assistance.
Finally, I’d like to thank the developers of Gephi, Pyomo, Python, and Gurobi for providing
the networks science analytical platforms for developing, modeling, and testing our com-
munity detection algorithm. I appreciate all of the support I have received throughout my




Beginning early in our lives, we are instructed to develop our skills to describe and under-
stand the complex world around us. We label, or define, other people based on our type
of connection or relationship to them. Social networks such as LinkedIn offer a platform
for capturing our professional relationships, and we can visually describe or model these
relationships using tools from network science. This abstract model can be created by
representing each object as a dot or vertexwith a corresponding label. This group of objects
could then be divided or partitioned into smaller groups, or communities, based on similar
attributes. Any two vertices that are related by the same attribute form a connection, or
edge, between them. Modeling the information from LinkedIn as a graph and analyzing
the graph using network science enables us to mathematically articulate relationships. This
leads to increased understanding of the local and global importance of people, or groups,
of people in our graph.
For example, we can arrange the people from a LinkedIn network into communities based
on physical attributes or other characteristics such as age, gender, type of profession,
educational background, job title, or history of employment. Which arrangement is correct?
All arrangements are technically correct, but one relationship or set of relationships may
be more appropriate depending on our goal. First, we need to understand why we are
sorting people into communities. Imagine we are retiring from the military and searching
for a new job that requires credible references. This end-user goal focuses our choice(s) of
relationships or layers on type of profession, educational background, job title, and history
of employment.
We can build a graph for each relationship by first plotting each vertex and then connecting
vertices with an edge if they have that relationship. For example, in the graph of the
profession layer, two people are connected if they have the same type of profession. This
visualisation of relationships as graphs allows us to identify communities based on the type
of profession.
Network science is concerned with describing systems, such as social interactions, by
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representing objects and their relationships as graphs with information known as networks.
Typically the term graph is used in theoretical contexts whereas the term network is used
in reference to the application of graph theory. For the purposes of this thesis, graph
and network are used interchangeably. If we want to describe our system using multiple
relationships between the same vertices, Bianconi [1] explains we can build collective layers
of graphs called multiplex networks. Defining and detecting communities across multiple
layers with large and diverse information data sets can become increasingly complex.
According to Radicchi et al. [2], community detection can be applied to help understand and
solve numerous technical and social problems. In the next section, we illustrate the utility
of community detection and describe the associated challenges of applying community
detection to multiplex dark networks.
1.1 Problem Description
Fear is not a newconcept, yet organizationswhose purpose is to spread fear remain difficult to
fully comprehend. These groups are known by many names, such as terrorists, insurgents,
or simply criminal organizations. In social network analysis, Bakker et al. [3] refer to
these organizations as dark networks. The complex structure of dark networks challenges
network science to develop more precise analytical methods to model and enhance our
understanding of these networks. Section 2.4 covers dark networks and their associated
analytical challenges in more detail. The following motivational anecdote builds from my
professional military experience with dark networks as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Officer.
As the senior Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Officer for Nangarhar Province in
Afghanistan, my mission required me to eliminate explosive threats produced by dark
networks and to provide counsel to the combatant commander on predicting and preventing
future attacks. To succeed at this mission, my teams required information to begin mapping
out the networks.
The evidence and intelligence my teams gathered as part of sensitive site exploitation was
catalogued and processed for the dual purpose of prosecuting members of dark networks
and assembling targeting packages for future missions. My reports were supplemented by
other intelligence sources and reports from various other units to form a collective database.
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Over the years, this temporal database has grown to include a wide spectrum and high
volume of information. How do we take advantage of this data to enhance our analysis of
a given network? Researchers visualize each aspect of a diverse data set as independent
graphs within a complex network.
Network science has developed several tools for analyzing single layers or aggregated
weighted graphs, whichKivelä et al. [4] define asmonoplex networks. Community detection
is one such tool that, when wielded appropriately, can increase our understanding of dark
networks. Community detection partitions the vertices of the graph into densely connected
groups. The properties of these communities can be studied both locally and within the
context of the global graph to build community profiles. The knowledge gained through
community profiles has the potential to assist the analyst in developingmore robust targeting
packages for network disruption. Developing a method that maximizes the information
gathered increases the depth of the analysis by producing more meaningful profiles of
network communities.
Analyzing layers independently or collapsing all layers into a monoplex network both fail
to capture the true details of the multiplex network. In the first case, we do not study the
network holistically, and in the second, we lose information by oversimplifying the network.
Researchers have made substantial progress on detecting communities in single layer net-
works. However, community detection in multiplex and multilayer networks has proven to
be particularly challenging. Several algorithms have successfully detected communities on
synthetic networks. However, when many of these algorithms are implemented on real net-
works, most have difficulty partitioning the network into the predetermined communities.
In this thesis, we explore a mathematical approach to defining and detecting communities
in multiplex networks.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
This research seeks a general purpose algorithm for multiplex networks that is detailed
enough to detect meaningful communities as well as flexible enough to be applied to a
variety of networks. The aim of this thesis is to build on research conducted on the merits
of layer aggregation methodologies used in multilayer community detection.
This thesis proposes a new algorithm that sorts the layers into aggregate weighted categories
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to enhance network data integrity and ultimately, to detect more meaningful communities.
Our method allows the user to choose the appropriate community detection algorithm and
the threshold that produces the most relevant community partition. We claim that this
new algorithm enhances network data integrity, resulting in more analytically meaningful
partitioned communities than current layer aggregation methods. Flexibility is achieved by
engaging the user at multiple stages throughout the methodology implementation process,
but also by offering a default. User input develops detailed and meaningful communities
within the context of the user’s analytical goals.
The goal of our proposed methodology is to increase the analytical depth of the resultant
multiplex communities. This objective is achieved by first allowing the user to choose
the appropriate combination of layers and weights per category. Next, the user picks the
appropriate community detection algorithm based on the data. Finally, the user enhances
both of these choices by selecting the threshold that gives the most relevant community
partition in the multiplex. This thesis focuses on real network data sets and attempts
to extend the methodology for general purposes. The resultant communities from this
proposed algorithm have the potential to enhance our current understanding of multiplex
networks. When this increased understanding is specifically applied to dark networks, it
has the potential to aid analysts in network disruption and consequently, to restore safety
and stability to terror inflicted regions.
In this thesis, we examine three dark multiplex network case studies to test our algorithm.
The Noordin Top Network provided the inspiration for our method and is discussed in
great detail. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Boko Haram
Terrorist Networks were used as further verification of our methodology. For each network,
we validate our algorithm by determining the adjusted conductance and cluster adequacy of
the resultant communities. To demonstrate the utility of finding communities for network
disruption purposes, we built a network flow shortest path interdiction model. The model
determines the optimal strategy, given a finite number of attacks, to disrupt the flow of
information from a set of supply sources to a set of demand destinations. We enhance
the optimal solution strategy for this model by examining the properties of the detected
communities in the Noordin Network. The goal of this enhancement is to achieve similar
optimal solutions while increasing the algorithm performance efficiency.
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1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized into six chapters including Introduction, Background, Data and
Methodology, Results and Analysis, Modeling and Application, and Future Work and
Recommendations. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, we examine prior work in network
science on community detection algorithms and dark networks. Chapter 3 provides an
overview of our data sets and a detailed explanation and justification for our methodology
using the Noordin Top Network. Chapter 4 presents our community detection results for
different threshold values in each data set and discusses the resultant community topological
characteristics, modularity, and conductance plots. Chapter 5 develops an attack and defend
model that demonstrates the application of the results from Chapter 4. The final chapter,
Chapter 6, recommends some potential extensions of this research to improve our detection
algorithm and our approach to disrupting networks using community properties.
5




In this chapter, we explore prior research contributions to community detection in multi-
layer networks. This research is organized into four sections including Network Science
Overview, General Community Detection, Multilayer/Multiplex Community Detection, and
Dark Networks. Network Science Overview introduces the reader to the basic terms and
concepts used in this mathematical field. General Community Detection covers some of the
challenges and current algorithms implemented for single layer networks. Multilayer/Mul-
tiplex Community Detection specifically focuses on efforts to develop algorithms that are
applicable to multilayer or multiplex networks. Dark Networks highlights the prior research
that has been conducted to specifically analyze the dark network case studies we examine
in Chapter 3.
2.1 Network Science Overview
Network science is a relatively new and progressive area of study within the field of discrete
mathematics. According to Newman [5], "network science is concerned with understanding
and modeling the behaviour of real-world networked systems." Notably, depending on the
field of study and context, many authors use nodes and vertices interchangeably in reference
to an object. For clarity purposes, vertices is used exclusively in this thesis. Network
science builds upon the mathematical framework established by graph theory. The study of
graphs provides the foundation for all of the analytical tools network science has developed
to describe complex systems. In Chapter 1, we introduced the concept of a graph using
edges and vertices. According to Bollobás [6], a graph, G, is defined as:
Definition 2.1.1. Graph
an ordered pair of finite disjoint sets (V, E) such that E is a subset of the set
V ×V of unordered pairs of V . The set V is the set of vertices and E is the set of
edges. If G is a graph, then V = V (G) is the vertex set of G, and E = E(G) is
the edge set. An edge {x, y} is said to join the vertices x and y and is denoted
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by x y . Thus x y and yx means exactly the same edge; the vertices x and y are
the end vertices of this edge.
Definition 2.1.1 can be generalized to networks to describe complex systems, by capturing
more than just the vertex-to-vertex relationship. Networks are more complex than graphs,
but they still simplify reality to develop a mathematical model for analytical purposes.
Newman [5] explains this connection by defining a network as:
Definition 2.1.2. Network
a simplified representation that reduces a system to an abstract structure cap-
turing only the basics of connection patterns and little else.
Definition 2.1.2 can be augmented to describe diverse data sets as multilayered networks.
Kivelä et al. [4] introduce the term aspect, d, where an aspect represents a different level
of dimensionality within a layer. For example, one aspect of a layer could be time, while
another aspect of the same layer could be displacement. Kivelä et al. further explain
that an elementary layer refers to one aspect and they distinguish the term layer to mean
the combination of elementary layers that belong to all aspects, much like the category of
elementary layers we will use in our research. The notation L represents a sequence of sets
of elementary layers, L = {La}da=1, where one set of elementary layers, La, is identified for
each aspect, a.
Kivelä et al. use the cartesian product L1 × ... × Ld to construct each layer in a multilayer
network by building a set of all of the linear combinations of elementary layers. To allow
for vertices to be absent in certain layers, they introduce VM ⊆ V × L1 × ... × Ld . They
add that two vertices are described as adjacent if they are connected to each other in the
same layer. However, two vertices are described as incident to each other if the vertices are
connected across different layers. Kivelä et al. provide the following notation to identify
the layer of the source vertex and the terminal vertex of an edge relationship: the set of
edges as EM , where EM ⊆ VM × VM . Kivelä et al. use the preceding notation to define a
multilayer network, M as:
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Definition 2.1.3. Multilayer Network
M = (VM, EM,V, L), (2.1)
where V is the total number of vertices in the Network, L = {La}da=1 for
elementary layers La for each aspect a, VM ⊆ V × L1 × ... × Ld, and EM ⊆
VM × VM [4].
Figure 2.1 depicts an example of amultilayer network using HumanHIV genetic interaction.
Differentiating between these types of connections allowsKivelä et al. to define connections
Figure 2.1: Human HIV-1 genetic interaction network. Adapted from [7].
between vertices within layers and between layers. If there is only one aspect type and the
set of vertices considered in each layer are identical, then we can further classify the
multilayered network as a multiplex. Kivelä et al. [4] state that a multiplex network is:
Definition 2.1.4. Multiplex Network
a sequence of graphs such that
{Gα}bα=1 = {(Vα, Eα)}bα=1, (2.2)
where Eα ⊂ Vα × Vα is the set of edges and α indexes the graphs.
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Alternatively, Kivelä et al. [4] describe multiplex networks using the termedge-colored
multigraphs, Ge. They define edge-colored multigraphs as:
Ge = (V, E,C), (2.3)
where V is the vertex set; C is the color set, which is used for labelling the type
of edge; and E ⊂ V × V × C is the edge set.
Figure 2.2 depicts an example multiplex network using social interactions on Twitter and
representing people as vertices, V . Connections between any two people, E, are plotted in
three separate graphs corresponding to retweeting, replying, and mentioning. Kivelä et al.
would consider these graphs as elementary layers that belong to the same aspect. However,
if temporal data was collected for when each action of retweeting, replying, and mentioning
occurred then we could build an additional layer of data as a separate aspect of the network.
Gray lines in Figure 2.2 depict vertices of one layer incident to vertices of another layer.
For a deeper explanation of this network see the paper written by Domenico et al. [8], The
Anatomy of a Scientific Rumor.
Figure 2.2: HIGGS multiplex social interaction Twitter data. Source: [8].
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When all the layers are collapsed into a single network with parallel edges or single edges
with weights, we can further classify the network as monoplex. Kivelä et al. [4] define a
monoplex network, O, as:
Definition 2.1.5. Monoplex Network
the aggregation of all of the layers of a multiplex network into a single weighted
layer. Aggregation is achieved by defining edge weights, m, between vertices
in each layer and expressing the final weight as a linear combination of m from
each layer.
When there is no order in layer importance, Kivelä et al. propose a default uniform
distribution of weights where m = 1 for each layer. We incorporate this default weight
concept into our methodology development in the next chapter. Figure 2.3 depicts a
multiplex network example, which represents airports as vertices, V ; direct connections
between airports as, E; and airline names as colors, C, for each layer. The far right layer
labelled Aggregate in Figure 2.3 is the resulting monoplex network after aggregating all
of the layers of the multiplex European Airport Network. The previous definitions have
explained our complex systems as networks and categorized them according to the types of
information they display. In our next set of definitions, Newman [5] describes some of the
vocabulary used to analyze network topology. He defines the topology of the network as:
Definition 2.1.6. Network Topology
the physical or logical arrangement and structure of the network.
Network topology can be described using a variety of quantities and measures of features
within a network. Some of thesemeasures include centrality, components, diameter, density,
average path length, and clustering coefficient. The preceding list of network topological
characteristics is not intended to be exhaustive. However, the topological characteristics
defined in Section 2.1.1 provide the reader with enough background to understand their
application within the context of this thesis.
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Figure 2.3: Multiplex European Airport Network. Adapted from [7].
2.1.1 Topological Characteristics
Centrality refers to how influential or important a vertex is within the scope of the network.
The influence of a vertex can be described locally amongst its neighbors or globally within
the context of the entire network. Some of the more popular measures of centrality include
degree, eigenvector, and betweeness centrality. Newman [5] defines degree and Eigenvector
centrality and Orman et al. [9] define betweeness centrality measures in the following
manner:
Definition 2.1.7. Centrality
the degree centrality, ki of vertex i, measures the involvement of a vertex in
a network by the number of vertices connected to it. Eigenvector centrality
calculates a degree centrality score proportional to the sum of the degree
centrality scores of its neighbors. Betweeness centrality asserts the ability of a
vertex to play a ’broker’ role in the network by measuring how well it lies on
the shortest paths connecting other vertices.
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For our purposes, betweeness centrality is particularly interesting since it involves the
connections between vertices on the shortest paths. Many network disruption techniques
involve some variation on increasing the lengths of the shortest paths. This makes vertices
with high betweeness centrality excellent targets. We attempt to apply this reasoning to
measure community centrality in Chapter 5 to build community targeting profiles. In
addition to betweeness centrality, another useful metric that involves shortest paths is the
average path length. Newman [5] defines the average path length as:
Definition 2.1.8. Average Path Length
the mean geodesic or shortest-path distance between pairs of vertices.
Average path length is a global measure that determines on average, the fewest number of
edges required to traverse between any two vertices. A small average path length number
implies there exists multiple redundancies in paths to connect vertices. This is typically the
case unless the network is not completely connected. It is often useful to describe a graph
by the number of independently connected groups of vertices or components. If a path
exists between every vertex in the graph to all other vertices in the graph, then the graph
is referred to as a connected graph and has only one component. Newman [5] defines the
component in an undirected network as:
Definition 2.1.9. Components
a maximal subset of vertices such that each is reachable by some path from
each of the others.
In the context of community detection, small components of graphs typically form their own
communities since they have no outward connections to the rest of the graph. Graphs with
one component are desirable for many analytical algorithms that rely upon high connectivity
and the ability to detect the shortest path in the network. Another characteristic that assists
in describing the relative size of a given network is the network diameter.
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According to Newman [5], the diameter is:
Definition 2.1.10. Diameter
the length of the longest finite geodesic path anywhere in the network.
We can visualize this metric by thinking of the network as a road map where each edge
represents a length of road between cities or vertices. The diameter is essentially the
maximum of the lengths of all the shortest paths between vertices in the network without
repeating edges. Another metric that involves connections between vertices is density.
Newman [5] refers to network density as:
Definition 2.1.11. Density
the fraction of edges that are actually present, out of the total number of possible
edges.
If every vertex in the graph is connected to all of the other vertices then it is referred to
as a clique with a density value of one. Density is also highly correlated to the clustering
coefficient. Clustering coefficient is the probability that vertices in the graph cluster together.
According to Newman [5], the clustering coefficient, C:
Definition 2.1.12. Clustering Coefficient
measures the average probability that two neighbors of a vertex are themselves
neighbors:
C =
(number of triangles) × 3
number of connected triples
, (2.4)
where connected triples means three vertices uvw with edges (u, v) and (v, w).
In a social context, this is analogous to the probability of friendship transitivity. This metric
determines the likelihood that person a is friends with person c given that person a is
friends with person b and person b is friends with person c. Now that we have explored
some definitions related describing networks, in the next sections we focus on the research
conducted on community detection.
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2.2 General Community Detection
Fortunato et al. [10] reveal that one of the difficulties of community detection is that a detailed
and comprehensive definition of community does not currently exist in network science.
Many authors, including Kivelä et al. [4], agree that a universal definition potentially
constrains the creativity and applicability of the development of community detection
algorithms. For the purposes of this thesis, the community definition developed by Radicchi
et al. [2] is used as a foundation. Their definition of community covers the general concept
without being too specific as to hinder the development of our methodology. Radicchi et
al. define communities as:
Definition 2.2.1. Communities
a subset of vertices within the graph such that connections between vertices
within the community are denser than connections with the rest of the network.
Radicchi et al. further classify communities as either weak or strong based on degree
counts. The subgraph, V , is a community in a weak sense if the sum of all of the degrees
within V is greater than the sum of the degrees towards vertices outside of V , where kini (V )
and kouti (V ) represent the degrees of the verticies inside and outside of the community
respectively. They symbolically represents this relationship as:
∑
i∈V
kini (V ) >
∑
i∈V
kouti (V ). (2.5)
Radicchi et al. explain that the subgraphV is only considered a community in a strong sense
if each vertex has more connections, ki, inside the community, kini (V ), than the vertex has
with the remainder of the network outside of the community, kouti (V ).
kini (V ) > k
out
i (V ),∀i ∈ V . (2.6)
In graph theory this concept of strong andweak communities has been previously introduced
by Eroh et al. [11] as an alliance. This concept provides a rough metric for understanding
the value of the communities that form as a result of our methodology.
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Du et al. [12] point out that algorithms are usually compared based on computational
complexity and accuracy. They refer to computational complexity as the time it takes an
algorithm to perform all of its mathematical operations as a function of an input size, n.
Du et al. further explain that this concept is known in the scientific community as big
O notation. While the computational complexity of community detection algorithms is
relatively easy to measure, accuracy is much more difficult to quantify.
The known community structure is often referred to as the ground truth. Ideally, the ground
truth can be used to compare and validate the resultant communities from the detection
algorithm. This has not been an effective method as ground truth communities are hard to
detect just from the topology of the network. Another challenge is establishing a ground
truth for comparison. In many cases the ground truth is not known, which makes it
difficult to determine if the algorithm successfully partitioned the network into appropriate
communities.
If the ground truth is known, Orman et al. [13] suggest Normalized Mutual Information
(NMI) as an algorithm performance measure. According to Ana et al. [14], this metric
compares the degree of similarity between two different partitions, Pa and Pb, of the same
set of data. Ana et al. define NMI by Equation 2.7 as:
NMI (Pa, Pb) =













where ni, j counts the false positives: the vertices identified by the algorithm to
be community i when in reality, the vertices belong to community j.
Orman et al. further explain that NMI values range from0 to 1, with 1meaning the algorithm
matches the ground truth. Jeub et al. [15] argue that in many cases, the ground truth is not
known and thus cannot be used as a comparison metric. Under these circumstances Jeub
et al. recommend measuring the conductance of the communities to develop the Network
Community Profile (NCP). Jeub et al. reveal that the purpose of the NCP is to establish
a pairing criteria for matching a given network with an appropriate community detection
algorithm.
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To define conductance, Jeub et al. introduce the following terminology. They begin by
defining a graph, G, as G = (V, E, w), where G has a weighted adjacency matrix A. Jeub
et al. add that the volume (vol) between two given sets of vertices S1 and S2 is equal to the
total weight of edges that connect S1 and S2. They [15] represents this relationship as:





Ai, j . (2.8)
Jeub et al. use the idea of volume to further develop the concept of conductance for a set
of vertices, S, as a ratio of the surface area of the hypothesized community to the volume
of the community. They define the surface area of the community as the volume between
the vertices that belong to the community denoted by the set, S, and the vertices that do not
belong to the community in the set, S. Under this construct, they [15] define conductance,
φ, of a set, S, as:
φ(S) =
vol (S, S)
min(vol (S), vol (S))
. (2.9)
Applying Equation 2.9, Jeub et al. conclude that the conductance of G is equivalent to the
minimum conductance of any subset of vertices.
φ(G) = min
S⊂V φ(S). (2.10)
Jeub et al. explain that conductance values range from 0 to 1, with smaller values cor-
responding to better quality communities. Unfortunately, calculating conductance is con-
sidered an Non-deterministic Polynomial-time (NP) hard problem. Essentially this means
that for large networks, the operational complexity is too large for computers to calculate in
real time. The dark networks used in this thesis are small enough that conductance can be
calculated directly using Equation 2.10. However, Jeub et al. offer a solution for calculating
the conductance of larger networks. Fortunately, Chung [16] has successfully approximated
φ(G) using the second smallest eigenvalue, λ2 of the normalized Laplacian. Building upon
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conductance, Leskovec et al. [17] developed the concept of the NCP to produce a commu-
nity quality score of the best community of a given size, k, as a function of the community
size, k:
φk (G) = min
S⊂V,|S |=k
φ(S). (2.11)
Plotting NCP values results in three meaningful behavioral trends regarding the best com-
munity size [15]. These behaviors can be identified in the following figure from Jeub et al.,
Figure 2.4.
1. Increasing slope: small communities are optimal Networks (b) Figure 2.4
2. Horizontal line: community quality is independent of k networks (c-d) Figure 2.4
3. Decreasing slope: large communities are optimal Network (a-b) Figure 2.4
Network Community Profiles Adjacency Block Models
Figure 2.4: Block Models and Network Community Profiles: (a) Zachary
Karate Club (b) Core-periphery structure example (c) Erdős-Rényi graph.
(d) bipartite block model example. Adapted from [15].
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According to Kivelä et al. [4], some of the more popular community detection algorithms
are centered around the modularity function. Newman [18] uses the concepts of modularity
and spectral graph properties to partition the network into modules or communities. He
defines network modularity as:
Definition 2.2.2. Network Modularity
the difference between the actual number of edges in a partitioned group and
the expected number of edges in a partitioned group for a similar network with
the same number of vertices, where the edges are randomly generated [18].
In the following example, Newman explains the concept of network modularity involving
a graph that is divided into two partitions. Given a graph G that has n vertices, G can be
partitioned into two groups, G1 and G2, where si = 1 if vertex i ∈ G1 and si = −1 if vertex
i ∈ G2.
In order to explain this algorithm, Newman first defines the number of edges between i and j
as ai, j . The ai, j values represent entries in the adjacency matrix A. If the degree of i and j is
ki and k j , respectively, and the total number of edges in G is m = 12
∑
i ki, then the expected
random number of edges between i and j can be expressed as ki k j2m . The modularity, Q, is
the result of summing ai j − ki k j2m for all pairs (i, j) in the same group.
After several observations and manipulation, Newman expresses modularity, Q, in matrix
form as:





where the modularity matrix represents~sT as the transpose of the column vector
with the group membership entries ~si, and B is a real symmetric matrix with
elements bi, j = ai, j − ki k j2m .
Newmanmathematically extended themodularity concept and expressed it using the spectral
properties of the graph. He defines the eigenvalues of B as βi and the corresponding
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eigenvectors of B as ui. And using them, he represents the membership vector ~s as a linear
combination of ui: ~s =
n∑
i=1















(uTi · ~s)2 βi . (2.13)
The established mathematical convention is to order the eigenvalues in non-increasing
order, β1 ≥ β2 ≥ ... ≥ βn. According to Chung [16], the largest eigenvalue, β1, and its
corresponding eigenvector, u1, capture the eigenvector centrality of vertices in a graph. In
order to maximize the modularity value, Q, in Equation 2.13, the dot product of uT1 and ~s
needs to produce the largest value possible. Since the elements of ~s are restricted to ±1, the
maximum value results when the sign of the corresponding elements of si and u1 match.
A direct consequence of maximizing Q is the partition of the network into two groups.
Any vertex that has corresponding positive elements is assigned to G1 and the remainder
are assigned to G2. Newman reveals that this concept can be adapted for communities
with overlap, where the vertices corresponding to the zero entries are assigned to both
communities.
While this method of partitioning the network using Definition 2.2.2 is only described for
two communities, the idea can be extended to form further partitions. Blondel et al. [19]
assert that by examiningG1 andG2 independently as sub-graphs and applying themodularity
method using Newman’s Equation 2.13, it is possible to further subdivide the network in a
hierarchical fashion until there are no more positive eigenvalues in the modularity matrix.
Under this procedure, a non-positive eigenvalue corresponds to an eigenvector filled only
with 1’s, which results in all vertices belonging to the same community.
Newman [20] describes a methodology that incorporates network modularity to partition
the network into communities referred to as the fast greedy algorithm. This algorithm
optimizes modularity by first assuming every vertex is its own community and begins
merging communities at each step until all of the communities have been merged into a
single large community. Orman et al. [13] explain that the largest increase or smallest
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decrease in modularity is recorded and compared at each step to determine the final best
partition of the network into communities.
Barabási [21] explains that modularity can be used as a metric for determining the optimal
partition of the network into communities. The closer the modularity value is to the value
one, the more optimal the partition. He demonstrates this concept in Figure 2.5 using a
small graph with nine vertices and 13 edges. Part a of Figure 2.5 depicts the optimal
partition of the graph into two communities with a modularity value of 0.41. This value
is considered optimal since there is no other arrangement of the vertices into communities
that creates a higher modularity value. Part b of Figure 2.5 demonstrates another partition
of the graph into communities that results in a smaller modularity value of 0.22 and is thus
labeled suboptimal. In part c of Figure 2.5 we can observe the effects of grouping all of the
vertices into a single community, which results in a modularity value of 0. Conversely, part
d of Figure 2.5 displays the case where all vertices belong to their own community, which
results in a negative modularity value of −0.12.
Figure 2.5: Understanding modularity using different community partitions
of a network: (a) Optimal M = 0.41 (b) Suboptimal M = 0.22 (c) One
Community M = 0 (d) Negative M = −0.12. Adapted from [21].
Orman et al. [22] cautions against using modularity as a community quality metric. They
argue that the modularity value is highly dependant on the size of the community. Fortunato
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et al. [23] support this assessment and state that for large networks, there is a limit imposed
by modularity for a detecting communities of a certain size. For example, a large scale
network with a high degree of interconnectedness between communities results in poor
modularity values for the network. This is problematic when the network structure ground
truth is partitioned into many small communities. This also makes it difficult to compare
modularity values between networks with different numbers and sizes of communities. To
combat this, Everton [24] believes a normalization metric needs to be considered.
Everton expands upon the idea of using modularity as a community quality metric by
advocating a similar metric, cluster adequacy. Cluster adequacy, Q′, normalizes graph
modularity, Q, by dividing the measured Q by the best possible Q for a given number
of communities, m. The best possible Q is determined as a function of the number of





Looking purely at themeasuredQ, it is possible tomistakenly conclude that the communities
are mediocre quality. However, by comparing the measured value of Q to the best possible
modularity for a given number of communities, cluster adequacy reveals that the community
quality is much higher. For example, in a graph of 100 vertices, the most ideal Q for two
communities is 0.5. Thus if the measured Q is also 0.5 then Q′ is computed to be 1. The
measured Q = 0.5 may seem mediocre, but when compared to the best possible Q, Q′ = 1
reveals this modularity and consequently community quality square to be ideal.
Cluster adequacy allows us to compare the quality of communities in different graphs by
normalizing the value relative to the number of communities in each graph. However,
cluster adequacy continues to introduce bias into the community quality measure. Cluster
adequacy favors a uniform distribution of vertices into equal sized communities, which is
rarely possible in real networks. Orman et al. [22] argue that similar to a degree distribution,
community size tends to follow a power-law distribution as well. However, Orman et al.
concede that some real networks deviate from this trend. Although this metric contains
flaws, it’s basis in modularity is particularly helpful in comparing communities that are the
result of modularity optimization based algorithms.
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Orman et al. [13] describe another modularity based algorithm known as the Louvain
method, which is an extension of the fast greedy algorithm using a two phased approach.
During the first phase, communities are initially identified using the fast greedy optimization
process. The second phase constructs an entirely new network by replacing all of the vertices
that belong to each community with a single vertex. The multiplicity of edges between the
newly formed vertices is preserved. The fast greedy is then applied to this new network until
all of the communities have been aggregated into a single community. The communities
in the original network are then created by collecting all of the original vertices that were
identified into the vertex in the fast greedy algorithm. Barabási [21] visually describes two
iterations of the the Louvain method using Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Louvain method using fast greedy at Step 1 and collapsing
communities at Step 2 for a total of two iterations. Source: [21].
According to Newman [5], the early implementations of modularity based algorithms
resulted in an operational complexity of at best O(n2). However, Clauset et al. [27]
determined that if the fast greedy algorithm is applied to a sparse network, the algorithm
can be modified to a reduced complexity of O(n log 2n). Newman [5] describes additional
algorithms such as the power method that seek to improve the speed of modularity based
algorithms by calculating eigenvector centrality without wasting computational efforts on
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calculating the remainder of the eigenvalues of B. According to Blondel et al. [19], the
Louvain method’s operational complexity can be approximated as O(n log n). How does
this operational complexity translate for large networks? Blondel et al. explain that if the
Louvainmethod is applied to a large networkwith 2million vertices, the algorithmwill finish
in approximately 2 minutes. Barabási [21] claims Louvain can actually be implemented
even faster with a complexity of O(m). This means that the algorithm speed is linearly
proportional to the number of edges in the network. This is a tremendous advantage when
applying the algorithm to large scale networks. Although the networks we consider in this
paper are relatively small we would like to design a methodology that works for any size
networks. Louvain’s desirable operational complexity enhances its credibility as an efficient
single layer community detection algorithm.
The relative speed of modularity based algorithms enable them to be applied to very
large networks. Additionally, Newman [18] advocates modularity based algorithms for
community detection because it does not require the user to input the size of the communities.
He further explains that this method does not preclude the possibility that there may only
be one community. This revelation means that not every network should to be partitioned
into communities. Newman reminds us that the absence of a partition is also useful in
describing the topological characteristics of the network. Another feature of this algorithm
is that every vertex is assigned to exactly one community. Barabási [21] argues that this
features limits the potential of themodularity algorithm to produce the best possible partition
of the network into communities. He supports this claim by demonstrating that a vertex with
a high degree and high clustering coefficient will naturally have a lower modularity based
on the definition of modularity. Consequently, these low modularity vertices will most
likely decrease the modularity of any communities that seek to incorporate them during the
fast and greedy portion of the algorithm. The area of research known as fuzzy community
detection also considers this to be a limitation.
According to Zhang et al. [28], fuzzy community detection allows each vertex to be simul-
taneously assigned membership to multiple communities. Zhang et al. propose an iterative
approach to propagating community membership degrees of all vertices in the network.
They incorporate the use of topological characteristics as a selection criteria for identifying
the starting vertex. New communities emerge under this construct from adjacent vertices
to the start vertex, and start vertices are updated at each iteration based on modularity
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performance. The algorithm developed by Zhang et al. claims to be highly flexible be-
tween performance and computational complexity. Our research in this paper focuses on
non-overlapping communities. However, the framework of our methodology is potentially
applicable to overlapping communities as well, as we allow the user the freedom to choose
the community detection algorithm for each layer.
2.3 Multilayer Community Detection
As a single layer of information might not provide enough information for community
detection, researchers have proposed various methods to detect community structure in
multilayer networks. Multilayer networks have a lot of information that can be helpful in
getting more modulated structure. Conversely, researchers such as Taylor et al. [29] believe
too much information can actually bring noise to the network while trying to identify
communities. Consequently, there must be a threshold of information that provides enough
and not too much information for community detection. However, this threshold may not
be the same for all types of networks, and we will address it in this research.
There are mainly two types of approaches to detect communities in multilayer networks:
Layer Aggregation Approach, and Non-Aggregation Approach. In layer aggregation ap-
proaches, all layers are merged into a single network to detect community structure. How-
ever, these approaches are limited to multiplex networks (because of vertex repetition) and
typically lose some information during the merging process. As a result, most researchers
focus on non-aggregation approaches.
2.3.1 Aggregation Methods
According to Kivelä et al. [4], one of the first pseudo-community detection methodologies
implemented on social networks was a concept known as blockmodeling. Batagelj [30]
describes blockmodeling as a general technique for partitioning the vertices of the network
into groups based on an identified common pattern. This methodology is technically not
community detection because it does not rely specifically on the density of connections
as described in Definition 2.2.1. Prescott et al. [31] successfully applied this process to
biochemical systems by building a multilayer network from a monoplex network.
25
One of the benefits of layer aggregation is the ability to exploit established community
detection algorithms for single layer networks. Mucha et al. [32] used a modularity based
algorithm to detect communities on individual layers or slices of a network. Their work
resulted in vertices identifying with different communities depending on the layer. Tang et
al. [33] used a similar approach by isolating individual layers to perform utility integration.
Utility integration constructs a utility matrix for each layer and then calculates an optimal
objective function using the summation of all of the utility matrices. Kivelä et al. [4]
comment that this approach allows flexibility in the definition of utility, allowing users to
choose established methods such as modularity to define utility.
The multislice approaches used by Mucha et al. and Tang et al. are beneficial for ana-
lyzing individual layers of the network, but they do not provide a satisfactory platform for
comprehensive layer analysis. Slicing captures all of the details of the layers by analyzing
them separately, but still requires a procedure for intersecting the analysis of these layers
to produce more meaningful results together. Analysing the details of each layer within
the context of the entire network is extremely challenging. According to Didier et al. [34],
many of the proposals for combining the analysis of individual layers include calculating
the intersection, union, or sum of the analysis of the layers. Our methodology expands upon
intersection aggregation techniques.
Kivelä et al. [4] introduce another class of aggregation methods called inverse community
detection, which makes use of the ground truth to cluster vertices into communities. Cai et
al. [35] describe that this method determines an optimal linear combination of weights, m,
that are applied during the layer aggregation process. An appropriate single layer community
detection algorithm that considers weights is then applied to the aggregate network. This
method is repeated, resulting in an optimal weight for each layer and consequently an
ordering of the layers. Rocklin et al. [36] built upon this method by clustering multiple
randomly weighted aggregate networks. They identified communities by constructing a
distance matrix between pairs of different clusters. The obvious limitation of this method
is that it requires knowledge of the realistically unattainable ground truth.
Taylor et al. [29] suggest it is possible to aggregate layers based on similarity to enhance the
identification of community structure in the network. They observe that utility integration
in the form of adjacency matrices quickly approaches a community detection limit as the
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number of layers in the network increases. They observed that aggregating similar or
redundant layers into a single layer enhances the performance of the utility based methods.
The algorithm introduced in this thesis builds off of the notion that layers can be combined
in a logical manner that maintains data integrity.
2.3.2 Non-Aggregation methods
Non-aggregation approaches seek to detect communities without combining the layers of
the network. Many of the proposed algorithms build from the foundation of single layer
detection. Howison et al. [37] build from the success of modularity-based algorithms and
proposes multilayer modularity maximization as a solution for detecting communities in
temporal multilayer networks. They explains that temporal multilayer networks are another
special class of multilayer networks that represents each layer as a different time step of
the network. Temporal layers are considered ordinal and uniform. This means layers are













δ(Cis, Cis+1 ), (2.15)
where Bs is the single layer modularity matrix computed on layer s defined in
Equation 2.12, Bi, j,s is the (i, j)th entry of Bs, τ is a sequence of adjacency
matrices for each layer, C is a partition of K sets of vertices, δ(Cis, Cjs ) is the
Kronecker delta function for each layer, and N is the number of vertices.
Didier et al. [34] also build off of Newman’s modularity concept by applying it to multiplex
biological networks. Didier proposes measuring the strength of the individual community
structure of each layer represented as a separate graph. This first step is similar to multi-
slicing approaches described in Section 2.3.1. This strength value is calculated by examining
for each community the sum of the proportions of within-community edges over all the
graphs minus the expectations of this sum. Using the logic that the sum of random variables
is congruent to the sumof their expectations, Didier et al. [34] derived the following equation
for multiplex modularity, QM , of a multiplex network, X (g),:
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Definition 2.3.1. Multiplex Modularity














where mg is the total number of edges of the graph X (g), and kgi is the corre-
sponding degree of vertex i in the graph X (g).
Didier et al. [34] implemented this methodology on a 4-layer Biological network, in which
each layer represents information from a different subset of genes or proteins. The multiplex
modularity method was compared against aggregation approaches using an adjusted Rand
index and verifying consistency with known biological processes. According to Santos
et al. [38], the adjusted Rand index is used to compare similarity between two partitions.
The results of the comparison by Didier et al. supports multiplex modularity as a more
accurate than common aggregationmethods for detecting strong communities in a biological
multiplex network.
The preceding work described on how community detection – in both aggregated and
non-aggregated approaches – overwhelming supports the inclusion of modularity into the
design process of algorithms. This thesis recognizes modularity as an extremely powerful
partitioning tool and incorporates it into our proposed methodology. For more information
on community detection in general and more details on multilayer community detection
approaches we recommend the paper by Kivelä et al. [4]. Now that we have explored some
research on community detection, in Section 2.4 we explore some background information
on dark networks to provide context for our algorithm development.
2.4 Dark Networks
There are many difficulties associated with mapping and analysing dark networks.
Krebs [39] uses the September 11th 2001 terrorist attack in the United States as a case
study in dark network mapping and analysis. Krebs describes three challenges previously
identified by Sparrow [40] that are specifically associated with mapping and analysing crim-
inal social networks. Krebs identifies these challenges as incompleteness, fuzzy boundaries,
28
and dynamic behavior.
Krebs states that incompleteness is a huge factor since criminal networks do not want to be
discovered [39]. As a consequence, networkmapping and analysis are limited by the volume
and availability of relevant and accurate data. Krebs clarifies the term fuzzy boundaries by
connecting it to the process of data filtration. Knowing which relationships are important
and which are not can have profound impacts on modeling and analyzing a network. The
importance of implementing a data filtration process led us to incorporate filtration into our
methodology in order to analyze the relationship data from the Noordin Network. Krebs
points out that another key idea from fuzzy boundaries is that not every vertex needs to
be included when mapping a terrorist network. This supports the idea that not all vertices
are essential to dark network analysis and thus do not need to be sorted into communities.
This idea will be incorporated in the development of our detection algorithm to sort some
vertices into a misfit community. The misfit community essentially acts as a theoretical
storage location for vertices that are not sorted into communities by our algorithm. The
last challenge Krebs identifies for dark network analysis is the dynamic behavior of the
network. The idea is that one finite viewing of the network results in an incomplete picture
of a dark network. Sparrow [40] suggests that overlaying temporal snapshots of the network
will enhance the overall understanding of the relationships between vertices in the network.
This follows because the actors of the dark network particularly keep interactions at a
minimum, thus temporal analysis has the potential to discover connected neighborhoods.
However, obtaining temporal data on dark networks has proven to be a difficult challenge
for researchers.
Krebs [39] utilizes a project team based approach to sort data on the network into four main
categories. These categories are tasks, resources, strategy, and expertise links. Data that
represents the meaning of one of the identified categories is placed in the same respective
category. Krebs believes overt project team analysis can be applied with some modification
to reveal information about covert project teams in a dark network. We apply this idea of
categorizing similar relationships in the development of our methodology.
Krebs focuses his analysis on relationship data in "trusted prior contacts" based upon the
research conducted by Erickson [41]. Erickson believes the densest and most meaningful
under-layer of a dark network is trusted prior contacts. According to Krebs [39], this
29
layer is usually not visible in current snapshots of the network. These dormant layers are
critical to maintaining secrecy and resilience through adaptability. For example, if one
contact becomes unavailable, a new contact can be established through accessing a dormant
trusted prior contact relationship. We explore these concepts further in our methodology
development and dark network modeling.
Krebs [39] further subdivided his trusted prior contacts relationship data based on the
strength of each relationship. He determined the strength of each relationship according to
the duration and relevancy to building trust. Classmates, living together, and trainingmet the
criteria for the strongest ties. Moderate strength included traveling partners, and meetings.
Dormant strength included financial transactions and occasional meetings. Visually, Krebs
represented the strength of each tie by the thickness of the connecting edge between people
in the graph of the network. This idea of assigning importance to layers or categories is
implemented in our methodology as well.
Krebs [39] describes dark networks such as the September 11th networks as sparse. There
was a noticeably high distance between hijackers on the same team. Usama bin Laden
explains the reason for sparseness in the network, stating that "Those who were trained to
fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other group" [39]. The
main idea is that if one member of the network is caught, the remainder of the network
cannot be compromised [39]. Generally this means there are very few brokers or connectors
between teams. Aswe apply community detection, ideally these brokers will become visible
as connectors between communities.
Sparseness in dark networks contributes to the idea that the definition of community should
not be applied for the purpose of identifying sub-organizational groups such as teams within
the network. Instead, we focused our definition of community based upon the end-user
analytical goals. Sparseness also makes it difficult to establish ground truth communities
for community detection algorithm accuracy comparison.
Meetings are used by dark networks to temporarily connect groups for collaboration and
coordination [39]. A vertex that may have seemed inactive, suddenly becomes important
after adding edges from the meetings layer of the network. Krebs explains that usually
one representative from each group is sent to a meeting, which again makes it even harder
to identify density based communities. His analysis revealed that the individuals selected
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to attend the meeting were usually connected by a trusted prior contact relationship. The
sparseness of the dark network emphasizes the need for combining data sets from multiple
types of relationships in order to help increase the density of network for analytical purposes.
To mitigate the impact of sparseness, we aggregate many similar types of relationships
during our methodology process and develop a procedure for inferring additional ties.
Everton [24] points our that one of the main purposes of dark network analysis is network
disruption. He comments that many dark network analysts take the approach of using high
degrees of centrality to identify key actors. Everton contends that this tactic may not always
be effective and encourages the analyst to examine more of the topographical characteristics
of the network to identify more appropriate targets for disruption purposes. Krebs [39]
concurs with Everton’s assessment and indicates that using centrality as a metric for dark
networks is likely to fail. He believes this is due to the incomplete nature of dark networks
and the high sensitivity of centrality computations based on small changes to the network,
especially for small networks.
The resiliency of a dark network is qualitatively described by Krebs [39] as strong due to the
high redundancy of trust relationships which includes classmates, kinship, or participating
in terrorist related training and operations. Krebs highlights the differences in social network
and covert network analysis. The classification of relationships as strong or weak ties is
entirely dependant on the type of network being analyzed. He maintains that for dark
networks, trusted prior contacts is typically considered a strong tie between two vertices
whereas the two vertices connected by the same nationality could be view as a weak tie. The
strong tie clearly emphasises a close relationship, whereas a weak tie viewed by itself may
offer only ambiguity on the relationship status. Analysis of strong ties in social networks
usually produces the "cluster of network players" [39]. However, Krebs believes network
players in dark networks may visibly appear to only have weak ties. Everton [42] supports
Mark Granovetter’s claim that an optimal combination of both weak and strong ties is ideal
for dark network analysis. This claim highlights the notion that multiple layers of data must
be included when analyzing the network. The incomplete and secret nature of the dark
network requires weak ties to help illuminate potential hidden strong ties.
Krebs offers a strategy for disrupting terrorist networks through information aggregation
and knowledge sharing. Under this strategy, the key vertices to target in the network are
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vertices with unique skills and vertices that have deep rooted trust relationships with other
groups. For more information on understanding dark networks and using topographical
characteristics to disrupt them see Everton’s book [24].
Gerdes [43] highlights another strategy that focuses on the detection of covert commu-
nities in a dark network over a five year time period. This strategy uses a hierarchical
agglomeration algorithm based on finding optimal network modularity in order to detect
communities. Gerde’s methodology was evaluated using a True Positive Rate that labels
one of the communities as covert, and calculates a performance ratio based on covert and
background population members found in the community. This strategy is particularly
interesting because it incorporates the temporal data recommended by Krebs in order to
facilitate a more comprehensive approach to detecting a target community. Our data set
includes some temporal information, but focuses on detecting multiple communities in the
network.
The research highlighted in this chapter served as the foundational understanding and inspi-
ration that enabled us to develop our methodology for detecting communities in multiplex
networks. Krebs and Sparrow helped us understand the sparse nature of dark networks.
Sparsity provides justification for several steps throughout our methodology. We used
sparsity and the arguments provided by Taylor et al. as reasoning for aggregating similar
relationships into categories and for converting cliques into communities. Taylor et al.
established the need for our algorithm to be selective on our layer choices and warned us
against the dangers of too many layers and redundancy. Mucha et al. and Kivela et al.
confirmed our intuition on layer aggregation and described how multi-slicing and single
layer community detection could be applied to a network. Didier et al. explained the
problems associated with aggregating layers, which allowed us to build from his research
to determine a new method for combining the multi-slicing and aggregation approaches
without compromising analytical depth. Krebs and Erickson guided our category selection
and ordering by establishing that trust was essential for dark networks to function. Newman
provided our foundational understanding of modularity in order to compare and contrast
modularity based algorithms. Our choice of single layer community detection using the
modularity based Louvain method was largely guided by Blondel et al. and Barabási’s
performance assessment and comparison against other existing algorithms. Barabási also
assisted us in understanding the weakness associated with modularity based algorithms by
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placing every vertex into a community. Identifying this weakness led us to develop the
concept of a misfit community. Incorporating this idea allows us to theoretically achieve
higher modularity values than traditional modularity algorithms make possible. Now that
we have explored the research that enabled this thesis, in the next chapter we apply our
understanding of this research in greater detail. This allows us to justify and explain our
algorithm to detect communities in multiplex networks.
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This chapter describes our network data sets, explains our multiplex community detection
methodology, and presents our detection algorithm.
3.1 Data Description
Three small, real, and dark multiplex network case studies were examined in this thesis.
The Noordin Top Network data we use is a subset of the original data compiled by Roberts
et al. [44]. Based on the discussion in Section 3.1.1, the Noordin Network is represented
by 133 vertices and 2451 edges. The Boko Haram Terrorist Network data set contains 44
vertices, and 99 edges and the FARC Terrorist Network data set contains 142 vertices and
1650 edges.
Each network data set is graphically represented as monoplex networkO using an analytical
graphing and network visualization tool called Gephi [45]. Following each monoplex visu-
alization is a degree distribution plot using JMP [46] statistical software. We highlighted
this network characteristic to visually demonstrate some of the differences between the three
dark networks. We constructed a global overview of the network presented in Table 3.1 that
captures the Total Number of Vertices (V), Total Number of Edges (E), Average Degree
(AD), Average Weighted Degree (AWD), Network Diameter (Di), Graph Density (De),
Modularity (M), Average Clustering Coefficient (ACC), Average Path Length (APL), and
Number of Partitioned Components (P) for each layer. These network topological charac-
teristics and the algorithms used to find them are explained by Chevren’s Book, Network
Graph Analysis and Visualization with Gephi [47]. For a more detailed explanation of
these topological characteristics terms, see Lewis’ book, Network science: Theory and
applications [48].
3.1.1 Noordin Top Network
The Noordin Top Network Data set contains the relationship information of 139 terrorists
that belong to five major parent terrorist organizations operating in Indonesia [44]. The
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network is named after the key broker, Noordin Top, who was known for coordinating
between terrorist organizations for training and operations. This network was primarily
developed from the information provided by an article published by the International Crisis
Group in 2006, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks [24]. Roberts et al. [44] used
this information to construct a possible total of 36 relationship types and attributes. We
re-organized the relationships and attribute data into edge lists to build the layers of the
Noordin Network used in this thesis.
The layers of the network are defined to be the different relationship types connecting
one vertex (person) to another vertex (person). The layers of the network are used in the
community definition. The attributes are the properties assigned to each vertex. The vertex
attributes will be used to measure community effectiveness and resilience. As it will be
discussed in Section 3.2.1, only 14 of these layers are used in this thesis. As a consequence
of using 14 layers, only a subset (133) of the known 139 terrorists is examined. Figure 3.1
illustrates an overview of the Noordin Network by collapsing the 14 selected layers into a
weighted aggregate monoplex network O. The individual layers are colored based on their
corresponding category, which is explained in Section 3.2.2. The monoplex network is
viewed in greater detail in Figure 3.2. Each type of relationship has an edge list. Multiple
occurrences of the same edge for each layer edge list results in a thicker line representation
of edge in O. The vertices in Figure 3.2 are colored based on degree. Higher degrees are
colored blue while lower degrees transition to the smallest degree color in red. Typically
the degree distribution follows the power law. However, the Noordin Network follows a
more sporadic distribution as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Notice that the highest degree on the
far right is Noordin Top. A summary of the associated properties of each of the separate 14
layers and the average of the layers is captured in Table 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: An overview of the Noordin Network. The 14 layers organized 
from left to right by category color with the monoplex O representing the 
aggregation of all the layers.
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Figure 3.2: Noordin Network monoplex, O.
38
Figure 3.3: Noordin Network weighted degree distribution.
Table 3.1: Noordin Network topological characteristics by layer.
Layer Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Classmates 44 217 9.32 9.86 7 0.22 0.35 0.76 2.48 1
Kinship 44 49 2.23 2.23 2 0.05 0.87 0.95 1.09 15
Soulmates 13 17 2.62 2.62 2 0.22 0.65 0.89 1.23 3
Friends 83 158 3.71 3.81 9 0.05 0.71 0.55 4.01 3
Mentor Ideological 21 15 1.43 1.43 5 0.07 0.68 0.00 2.03 7
Mentor Supervisory 46 51 2.22 2.22 6 0.05 0.57 0.40 2.50 6
Mentor Technological 13 13 2.00 2.00 5 0.17 0.34 0.00 2.20 2
Recruiting 27 24 1.78 1.78 3 0.07 0.75 0.37 1.78 5
Meetings 33 110 5.33 6.67 4 0.17 0.33 0.84 2.16 1
Communication 120 318 5.30 5.30 8 0.05 0.54 0.53 3.10 1
Logistical Place 34 106 5.71 6.24 3 0.17 0.28 0.83 1.73 5
Operations 60 490 15.63 16.33 2 0.27 0.51 0.94 1.67 4
Training 54 291 9.74 10.78 4 0.18 0.58 0.89 2.33 2
Logistical Function 49 592 22.61 24.16 2 0.47 0.28 0.89 1.53 1
Average 46 175 6.40 6.82 4 0.16 0.53 0.63 2.13 4
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3.1.2 The Boko Haram Terrorist Network
The Boko Haram Terrorist Network data set contains the relationship information of 44
terrorists that belong to an Islamic sect that primarily operates in northern Nigeria since
2002. According to Walker [49], the group believes the current government in Nigeria is
corrupted by false Muslims. The network is extremely sparse due to its relatively young
cell-like structure, and lack of collective leadership. This network data set was created by
Cunningham [50] using a variety of open source documents. We re-organized the available
relationship data into edge lists to build 9 separate layers for the case study on the Boko
Haram Terrorist Network.
Figure 3.4 illustrates an overview of the Boko Haram Network by collapsing the 9 layers
into a weighted aggregate monoplex network O. Figure 3.5 enhances the representation
of the monoplex to include the label identification of each vertex. This network follows a
power law distribution as depicted in Figure 3.6. A summary of the associated properties
of each of the separate 9 layers is captured in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: An overview of the Boko Haram Network. The 9 layers organized
from left to right by category color with the monoplex O representing the
aggregation of all the layers.
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Figure 3.5: Boko Haram Network monoplex, O.
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Figure 3.6: Boko Haram Network weighted degree distribution.
Table 3.2: Boko Haram Network topological characteristics by layer.
Layer Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Colleagues 9 8 1.78 1.78 4 0.22 0.41 0.00 2.33 1
Kinship 6 3 1.00 1.00 1 0.20 0.67 NA 1.00 3
Superior 18 17 1.89 1.89 3 0.11 0.54 0.18 1.93 4
Supporter 5 3 1.20 1.20 2 0.30 0.44 0.00 1.25 2
Financial Ties 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Communication 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Membership 14 32 2.71 4.57 2 0.21 0.30 0.93 1.34 4
Shared Events 16 21 2.63 2.63 2 0.18 0.40 0.81 1.22 5
Collaboration 13 13 2.00 2.00 7 0.17 0.47 0.35 2.84 2
Average 9 11 1.69 1.90 3 0.38 0.36 0.38 1.55 3
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3.1.3 The FARC Terrorist Network
The FARC Terrorist Network data set includes the relationship information of 142 terrorists
known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that primarily operates in Columbia
andVenezuela since 1964. According toWeimann [51], the organization believes inMarxist
ideology and seeks to overthrow the Colombian government. The network is sparse for
most layers, but has a well-documented hierarchical structural layer due to social media [51].
This network data set was created by Cunningham et al. [52] using a variety of open source
documents. We re-organized the available relationship data into edge lists to build 10
separate layers for the case study on the FARC Terrorist Network.
Figure 3.7 illustrates an overview of the FARC Network by collapsing the 10 layers into a
weighted aggregate monoplex network O. Figure 3.8 provides an enhanced visualization
of the monoplex by increasing the size of the diagram. The labels are non-existent in this
figure due to the anonymity of the available data set. This network has an unusual degree
distribution that is illustrated in Figure 3.9. It has 42 vertices in themiddle of the distribution
with relatively high degrees of 35. This is most likely due to the highly visible hierarchical
leadership structure of the network depicted as yellow vertices in Figure 3.8. A summary
of the associated properties of each of the separate 10 layers is captured in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.7: An overview of the FARC Network. The 10 layers organized 
from left to right by category color with the monoplex O representing the 
aggregation of all the layers.
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Figure 3.8: Boko Haram Network monoplex, O.
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Figure 3.9: FARC Network weighted degree distribution.
Table 3.3: FARC Network topological characteristics by layer.
Layer Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Friendship 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Kinship 8 8 2.00 2.00 1 0.29 0.41 1.00 1.00 3
Superior 17 12 1.41 1.41 2 0.09 0.74 0.00 1.52 5
Supporter 3 2 1.33 1.33 2 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.33 1
Lovers 8 4 1.00 1.00 1 0.14 0.75 NA 1.00 4
Radicalizer 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Communication 9 7 1.56 1.56 4 0.19 0.46 0.00 2.23 2
Meetings 17 30 3.53 3.53 3 0.22 0.43 0.91 1.44 4
Shared Orgs 120 1577 24.6 26.3 4 0.21 0.50 0.95 1.87 5
Collaboration 13 8 1.23 1.23 2 0.10 0.78 0.00 1.27 5
Average 20 165 3.87 4.04 2 .39 .41 .41 1.37 3
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3.2 Methodology Overview
In this section we introduce the process, or algorithm, used to transform the data from a
multiplex network into meaningful partitioned communities according to user-based ana-
lytical goals and objectives. Figure 3.10 provides an overview of our methodology and
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code for implementing this algorithm. This method takes
layers of multiplex network M as an input and produces threshold controlled communities
as an output.
Aggregating all of the layers of M creates the simple weighted graph G. The layers of the
M are sorted into weighted categories (Categor ywi ). The layers of each Categor ywi are
aggregated to form a simple graph for individual category community detection. These
communities in each category are converted into weighted cliques based on the assumption
that edges are missing as minimal information is usually captured on terrorist networks. The
aggregation of all of these cliques results in the weighted graph W . Choice of a threshold
ε results in components inWε that create the final communities, which we then identify in
G. The vertices in G are partitioned into the recently identified communities in Wε. The
algorithm is designed to identify communities of order two and larger. Any vertex that is
not sorted into a community is placed in the Misfit Community by default.
A user-based approach is implemented to increases flexibility of the algorithm and heighten
the defined categories ability to capture the user-intended meaningful communities as a
result (with a default built in). Cheever et al. [53] reveal that the user-based approach
philosophy has been implemented by many solution directed companies such as Decision
Lens. They further explain that Decision Lens incorporates user feedback at multiple stages
during the model development process to develop a product that accurately reflects the
user’s goals.
Building user input into our algorithm is essential to producing meaningful communities.
This understanding is critical in developing and selecting an appropriate detection algorithm.
Failure to skip this contextual step in the algorithm developmental process will result in a
misleading product, identifying communities that might have different reasons for clustering
together.
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Each step is described in detail using the following format. The step is first introduced
and explained using a general network illustrated in Figure 3.10. The general case is then
followed by a specific example using the Noordin Network to demonstrate some of the
features of the algorithm in more detail. Figure 3.11 illustrates the application of all of the
algorithm steps to the Noordin Network.
49
Step	  4:	  	  
Convert	  	  
Communi,es	  




to	  all	  clique	  edges	  	  






























































CATEGORYw1	   CATEGORYw2	  





Aggregate	  Simple	  Graph	  G	  
from	  Mul,layer	  Network	  M	  
Step	  5:	  	  
Aggregate	  ∑wi	  
to	  build	  weighted	  
graph	  W	  	  
Step	  6:	  	  
Nodes	  in	  the	  
components	  of	  Wε	  
give	  communi,es	  	  
Output:	  	  
Plot	  resul,ng	  	  
communi,es	  in	  G	  
Results	  of	  
ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Communi:es	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Community1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Community2	  





















w1	  +	  w2	  w1	  +	  wm	   w1	  +	  w2	  w2	  
w1	  +	  w2	  
w1	  +	  w2	  +	  wm	  
wm	  
w1	  +	  w2	  
w
1	   +	   w








w1	  +	  w2	  +	  wm	  
Step	  2:	  	  
Weighted	  	  Category	  Sor,ng	  
OCategory1	   OCategory2	   OCategorym	  
CliqueW1	   Cliquew2	   Cliquewm	  
Categoryw1	  =	  {1,2,…k}	  Categoryw2	  =	  {k+1,k+2,…t}	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
•  	  	  
•  	  	  
•  	  	  
Categorywm	  =	  {f+1,f+2,…n}	  
	  
	  
Figure 3.10: Algorithm overview (general case).
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Figure 3.11: Algorithm overview (Noordin example)
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Algorithm 1Multiplex community detection algorithm.
Input: Aggregate simple graph, G; multiplex layers, l; set of all layers in the multiplex, S; single layer
community detection algorithm; category weights, wi , where i = {1, 2, ...,m}; and threshold, ε; and PDC
definition.
Steps 1-2: Manual layer selection and category
formation from similar layers.
for l in S do: . for each layer in the multiplex
if l supports the PDC definition then: . user judgement
Append l to the layer selection list, S′ . S′ ⊂ S
for li in S′ do: . for each selected layer
for l j in S′ do: . for each selected layer
if li is similar in meaning to l j then: . user judgement
Append li and l j to the same category
Step 3: Discover Communities in each category.
for each category do:
Aggregate all layers . creates sub-monoplex graph
Perform single layer community detection . user choice, default Louvain
Step 4: Convert communities to cliques and assign wi .
for all communities in each sub-monoplex do:
Remove external community edges . creates component graphs
Connect all vertices inside each community . creates clique components
for all edges in each clique component do:
Assign value to wi . user choice, default wi = 1∀i
Step 5: Form consolidated weighted graph,W , by merging cliques
from all categories with appropriate category weighting factor.
for each weighted edge in each sub-monoplex clique component do:
Merge cliques from all categories . buildsW
Step 6: Threshold weighted graph,W .
for edges inW do
if ε ≥ ∑mi=1 wi then
plot edge in graphWε . removes ε <
∑m
i=1 wi , buildsWε
if Wε is sufficiently partitioned then: . user judgement
Components are the final communities
if execute single layer community detection then: . user choice, default Louvain
New communities are the final communities
if vertices from G are not in communities then:
place vertices in Mis f it_Communit y . accounts for all vertices in G
Output: Final communities plotted in G
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3.2.1 Step 1: Layer Selection
This first step is focused on preparing and selecting the network data that is most appropriate
based on the user’s goals. First, we examine the user’s goals to understand the motivation
behind identifying communities. From this we introduce the concept of the purpose-driven
communities (PDC).
Definition 3.2.1. Purpose-Driven Communities
Given a multiplex network M and a user U , the PDC are the intersection of user-inspired
categorical communities based upon the analytical needs of U . The PDC’s structural
properties enhance the customer’s understanding of the network in order to achieve the
customer’s objective.
For the general case depicted in Figure 3.10, a total of n layers (2 ≤ n ≤ |V (G) |) are
selected from the available network database of layers from the choices of {1, 2, ..., k, k +
1, ..., t, t + 1, ..., f , f + 1, ...n}. The selection of theses layers is entirely dependant on the
user’s analytical goals. The detection algorithm’s success and subsequent depth of the
community property analysis are also dependent on the available relationship data. This
step may be revisited to include new layers or exclude current layers as appropriate. Once
the layers have been selected, they will be sorted into one of m categories (m ≤ n) as
described in Step 2. Layers are sorted into categories based on Kreb’s observation that dark
networks are sparse. The aggregation of similar layers into categories reduces sparseness
and increases network density for more accurate community detection.
Categor yw1 = {1, 2, ...k}




Categor ywm = { f + 1, f + 2, ...n}
We apply Step 1 to the Noordin Top Network as an example. In the absence of a physical
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customer, this thesis uses the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) Attack the Network (AtN) philosophy to infer the customer objectives.
Martin et al. [54] describe the mission of JIEDDO is "to focus, lead, advocate, and coordi-
nate all Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their
respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices as weapons of
strategic influence." This thesis adapts the JIEDDO mission statement to include the pre-
vention of coordinated terrorist operations. The United States Joint Forces Command [55]
summarizes JIEDDO’s AtN objectives to:
1. Identify key leaders in the network
2. Understand influence and relations
3. Identify and capitalize on vulnerabilities
4. Disrupt activities
5. Eliminate the ability for the network to function.
Understanding these customer objectives provides context and focus for our PDC definition.
Based on the inferred assumptions about the customer’s objectives, amore focused definition
of PDC can be established. JIEDDO essentially wants to learn more about the terrorist
network for the purposes of disrupting its ability to function. Based on this reasoning, our
PDC for the Noordin Network are knowledge sharing communities (KSC).
Definition 3.2.2. Knowledge Sharing Communities
Given the Noordin Network and JIEDDO, the KSC are the intersection of Trust, Lines
of Communication, and Knowledge communities based on the need to disrupt intra-
organizational coordination in the Noordin Network.
Using the definition of KSC, we selected the following 14 layers illustrated in Figure 3.12
from the available 36 layers in the Noordin Network Data Set. Layers not included either
were classified as weak and redundant or irrelevant layers. For example, the classmate layer
was chosen over the education layer because the classmate layer included people who were
in the same class in the same school whereas the education layer included people who went
to the same school. Classmate thus established a stronger relationship tie and education
was excluded as a redundant weaker layer. External communication is an example of an
irrelevant layer that does not support the KSC definition and was thus not included in the
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selected layers. This layer is irrelevant because it focuses on relationships outside of the
network. In Step 2, these layers are sorted into weighted categories.
Figure 3.12: Step 1: Layer selection (Noordin example).
3.2.2 Step 2: Layer Sorting into Weighted Categories (Categor ywi )
Now that we have identified the n layers, each layer is placed into exactly one of m weighted
categories
Categor ywi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}.
Following our user-based philosophy, categories are chosen based on their relevance to
the user’s analytical goals. Weights are assigned to each category based on the degree
of importance and associated contribution toward forming the PDCs. As a default, all
categories are assigned a weight value of one. If a foundational category is identified, then
the respective weight of the foundational category should be chosen to be greater than the
summation of the remaining categories.
w f oundation >
m∑
i=1
wi − w f oundation
Definition 3.2.3. Foundational Category
A category is labelled foundational if the relationships in this category are critical to the
definition of the PDC.
A minimum of two categories is recommended for achieving analytical depth. If only one
category were used then the resulting analysis would be the same as a collapsed simple
graph. While an upper-bound is not mandated, it is suggested to be no higher than 50% of
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the total number of layers.
2 ≤ m < 0.5n.
An unbalanced number of categories may result in toomany small community intersections.
After the categories have been established, Step 1 may be revisited to adjust layer selection
from the given network data set.
Applying Step 2 to the Noordin Network results in the 14 layers being sorted into three
categories, as illustrated in Figure 3.13. The layers were sorted into categories based on the
KSC definition. In the case of our dark networks, three categories was optimal for grouping
similar layers. However, the PDC definition and available network data may lead the user
to create more categories.
1. Trust: Members of the KSC must trust each other in order to develop the will to
communicate. Layers included build or demonstrate trust between members.
2. Lines of Communication (LOC): Members of the KSC require a communication
medium to share knowledge. Layers included in this category allowmembers to share
knowledge.
3. Knowledge: Members of the KSC need meaningful information or knowledge to
share. Layers included are tasks, events, and resources that members want or need to
share using one of the LOC layers.
The use of these three categories allows our algorithm to produce members of a KSC that
have knowledge that they are capable of and willing to share with other members of the
KSC. The topological characteristics for the categories and the aggregate monoplex, O, for
Noordin, Boko Haram, and FARC terrorist networks are represented in Table 3.4, Table 3.5,
and Table 3.6 respectively.
Table 3.4: Noordin Network topological characteristics by category.
Category Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 111 544 7.53 9.80 7 0.07 0.51 0.66 3.10 3
LOC 121 534 6.33 8.83 7 0.05 0.38 0.57 2.92 1
Knowledge 106 1373 22.4 25.9 5 0.21 0.41 0.79 1.93 3
Average 113 817 12.0 14.8 6 0.11 0.43 0.89 2.65 2
Monoplex (O) 133 2451 22.5 36.9 5 0.17 0.35 0.71 2.13 1
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Table 3.5: Boko Haram Network topological characteristics by category.
Category Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 29 31 2.07 2.14 4 0.07 0.56 0.26 2.28 5
LOC 17 34 2.47 4.00 2 0.15 0.33 0.92 1.48 5
Knowledge 21 34 2.95 3.24 7 0.15 0.46 0.56 2.64 4
Average 22 33 2.50 3.13 4 0.12 0.45 0.58 2.13 5
Monoplex (O) 44 99 3.32 4.50 5 0.08 0.50 0.50 2.42 6
Table 3.6: FARC Network topological characteristics by category.
Category Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 32 28 1.68 1.75 3 0.05 0.81 0.39 1.61 8
LOC 130 1614 23.2 24.8 6 0.18 0.51 0.93 2.28 3
Knowledge 13 8 1.23 1.23 2 0.10 0.78 0.00 1.27 5
Average 58 550 8.70 9.26 4 0.11 0.70 0.44 1.72 5
Monoplex (O) 142 1650 21.5 23.2 8 0.15 0.52 0.91 2.90 1
We tested several sets of cases on the Noordin Network using different weights. During one
case study, the Trust category was given the highest weight of w1 = 4, followed by LOC
with w2 = 2 and Knowledge with w3 = 1. This weighting system was applied based on
the reasoning that Trust is the foundational category required to build KSCs. The dynamic
nature of the dark network allows two people that are only connected by trust to potentially
develop LOC and Knowledge and ultimately build a KSC. The combined weight of LOC
and Knowledge is intentionally less than Trust to further establish Trust as a foundational
category (w1 > w2 + w3).
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Figure 3.13: Step 2: Weighted category sorting (Noordin example).
3.2.3 Step 3: Community Detection on Categories
All of the layers of each Categor ywi are aggregated to form a sub-monoplex network
OCategor yi . The user is given the option to choose which single layer community detection
algorithm to implement on each OCategor yi . This research recommends the well estab-
lished and used Louvain method described in Section 2.2 due to its relatively efficient
computational complexity based on accuracy.
The results of applying this step to the Noordin Network Categories are depicted in Fig-
ure 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Step 3: Community detection algorithm (Noordin example).
3.2.4 Step 4: Community to Clique Conversion
The resultant communities for each category are converted into cliques. Each community
within the categories is represented as a complete graph to emphasize the edge relationship
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of belonging to the same community. The edges within each category are given the same
respective categorical weight.
Applying Step 4 to the Noordin Network results in the complete community cliques for
Trust, LOC, and Knowledge illustrated in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Step 4: Community to clique conversion (Noordin example).
3.2.5 Step 5: Build the Weighted GraphW
This step combines the resultant clique communities from all of the categories into an
aggregate weighted graphW . The edge weight, ew jk between any two vertices v j and vk in




wi,∀ j k ∈ Categor ywi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Applying Step 5 to the Noordin Network results in the aggregate graph W pictured in
Figure 3.16.
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Figure 3.16: Step 5: Weighted graph, W (Noordin example).
3.2.6 Step 6: Communities Through Tolerance ε Selection
The final step of this method is again user-driven to determine an acceptable threshold
tolerance, ε. Choosing different thresholds creates a constraint on the graph that limits
the amount of data considered to build communities. A choice of ε =
∑m
i=1 wi carries the
strongest meaning and true intersection of communities across the m categories. The user is
left to decide an acceptable value for ε and may want to experiment with different ε values
to produce the desired meaningful communities. The sum of all of the category weights
serves as a logical upper-bound for ε. If a foundational category exists, then the weight of
the foundational category is recommended as a lower bound for ε. This prevents the other
categories from forming communities without including the foundational category.
The threshold selection of ε results in partitioningW into components. These components
of W are the PDCs. Any components that contain only one vertex are placed into a misfit
community. As a final output, the algorithm plots the resultant PDCs’ nodes onto O to
observe inter-community relations in the Network to create the final communities plotted
in O.
Applying Step 6 to theNoordin Network results in theKSC identification and the subsequent
plot in O illustrated in Figure 3.17. In order to demonstrate this step, ε ≥ w1 + w2
was selected as an example to partition the graph into KSCs. The following bounds are
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recommended for cases with a foundational category for ε:
max{wi} ≤ ε ≤
m∑
i=1
wi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...m}.
Optional Step: If the output results in one component or the network is not sufficiently
partitioned according to the user’s goals, we suggest executing single layer detection once
more on Wε. Why would we do this? Lets consider what Wε actually represents. This
is a graph with vertices that are related because of the chosen threshold, ε, intersection
of categorical community relations. Performing community detection once more will
partitionWε into groups of vertices that are more related by this intersection of categorical
communities inside their group than to other vertices outside their community. This optional
process is consistent with the integrity of our definition of KSC.
Figure 3.17: Step 6: KSCs and plot in O (Noordin example).
Algorithm 1 was applied to all three dark network case studies. The results of this algorithm
are studied in the next chapter, Chapter 4.
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This chapter focuses on our experiment design, displaying and analyzing our results. First,
we define our experiment in Section 4.1. All sections that follow contain the results and
subsequent analysis of applying our community detection methodology on the three dark
networks from Chapter 3.
4.1 Experiment Design
Three case studies were considered for each dark network. Each case study represents
a different selection of weight values for w1, w2, and w3 as described in Step 3 of our
methodology. We then studied nine subcases for each case that corresponds to different
choices for epsilon as described in Step 6 of our methodology. Figure 4.1 depicts the
organization of the different weight cases and threshold subcases studied in this chapter.
Case	  1	  
w1=1,	  w2=1,	  w3=1	  
Case	  2	  
w1=3,	  w2=2,	  w3=1	  
Case	  3	  









ε	  ≤	  6	  	  
Subcase	  
2.2	  	  
ε	  ≤	  5	  	  
Subcase	  
2.3	  	  
ε	  ≤	  4	  	  
Subcase	  
2.4	  	  
ε	  =	  6	  	  
Subcase	  
2.5	  
ε	  =	  5	  
Subcase	  
2.6	  	  
ε	  =	  4	  	  
Subcase	  
2.7	  	  
ε	  ≥	  5	  	  
Subcase	  
2.8	  	  
ε	  ≥	  4	  	  
Subcase	  
2.9	  	  





Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 case study organization.
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We grouped the subcases in sets of three based on ε values corresponding to : ε ≤
w1 + w2 + w3, w1 + w2, and w1 + w3; ε = w1 + w2 + w3, w1 + w2, and w1 + w3; and ε ≥
w1 + w2, w1 + w3, and w1 respectively. For display purposes, we focused on plotting the
individual subcase community results for the Noordin Network. First, we show the output
community graphs in the original monoplex network from Step 6 of our methodology. For
visual clarity, communities of size less than or equal to three are colored grey in these plots.
A legend with the corresponding community name, community size percentage, and color
accompanies each community output graph.
We follow the community output graphs with the community size and adjusted conductance
plots per community. The community names are the independent variables on the x-axis
with M representing the misfit community. The community size and adjusted conductance
values are the dependant variables on y-axis. We plotted two different adjusted conductance
values. Adjusted conductanceW is the result of re-plotting the resultant communities from
our methodology back into the weighted graph W . Adjusted conductance O is the result
of re-plotting the resultant communities from our methodology back into the original
monoplex graph O. These values are represented as red circles connected by a dotted red
line. Displaying the community size information allows us to potentially correlate adjusted
conductance to size and identify specific communities that are present in multiple subcases.
We also believe there may be some correlation between the average adjusted conductance
and the size of the misfit community. The community size is represented as blue diamonds
with a solid blue line. All plots are ordered by either increasing adjusted conductanceW or
increasing average adjusted conductanceW .
After all of the network cases have been examined, we display the average results for the
network in a summary plot. This includes the average community size, cluster adequacyW ,
cluster adequacy O, average adjusted conductanceW , and average adjusted conductance O
represented as blue diamonds and a solid line, green squares and a solid line, green circles
and a dotted line, red squares and a solid line, and red circles and a dotted line respectively.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the conductance, φ, ranges from 0 to 1 and that the smaller
the conductance value, the better the community quality. Since cluster adequacy values
range from 0 to 1 with larger values resulting in stronger communities, we adjusted the
conductance values for metric comparison clarity. We achieved this by subtracting the
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conductance values from 1. As a result, larger values for adjusted conductance, φ1, and for
cluster adequacy are considered consistent with higher quality communities.
We compare each plot against an established control case. For the purposes of this thesis,
we use the communities that result from implementing the Louvain method on the original
monoplex network as our control. The control case average cluster adequacyO and average
adjusted conductanceO are displayed on the summary plots as a dashed green and dashed red
lines respectively. This control provides us with an established benchmark for community
quality comparison.
Before conducting this experiment, we established our hypothesis for the quality of com-
munities that are produced by the different cases and subcases. Qualitatively, we believe
Case 3 will produce the most meaningful communities based on our definition of KSC.
Case 3 provides the necessary category weight distribution for the trust foundation cate-
gory to dominate the remaining community information from the other categories. Krebs
and Everton established the importance of trust to the functionality and resilience of dark
network in Section 2.4. Forcing trust to be included as the lower bound for epsilon choices
in this case is consistent with their convictions.
Quantitatively, our intuition is that for a given value, v , subcases that involve ε ≤ v will
result in a small number of large sized communities. We believe this threshold will be too
relaxed of a choice for ε. The subcases for ε = v will produce many communities that are
very small as we exclude particular relationships from enforcing an equality in the treshold
versus inequality. Also, it prevents vertices from being neighbors in certain categories
in order to achieve equality, which doesn’t seem to be realistic, but we consider them for
completeness. Consequently, these cases may be too restrictive of a choice for ε. Finally,
we believe the subcases for ε ≥ v will produce better communities since these subcases are
more relaxed than ε = v , yet more restrictive than ε ≤ v , requiring that vertices are friends
in at least that many categories, but possibly more.
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4.2 Noordin Results and Analysis
In this sectionwe display the results and analysis of applying ourmethodology to theNoordin
Network. First, we display the community graph results and the size and conductance values
for the control case in Figure 4.2. We follow the control case with the results and preliminary















Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Communi*es	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  26%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  20%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  02%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  




5 6 1 42 30
Figure 4.2: Noordin control case community output plot and size, and con-
ductance plot.
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The control case yielded a total of seven communities, five of which were large and two
relatively small. We observe that the smallest communities have the highest adjusted con-
ductance in Figure 4.2 and that the smallest community, communit y4, has a perfect adjusted
conductance value of one. It is important to note that communit y4 is an isolated component
of the network. Component communities have no external community connections, which
results in no neighbors in S. Since S is empty, the conductance calculation simplifies to zero,
which yields a value of one for adjusted conductance. Communit y4 from the control case
is also visible in subcases where ε ≤ v . For example, in case 1, subcases 1.1, 1.2, and1.3
as communit y3, communit y2, and communit y2 respectively in Figure 4.4. Upon further
inspection, this two vertex component relationship exists only in one category, trust. This
community does not exist in the remaining subcases due to the increased restriction imposed
by ε = v and ε ≥ v .
4.2.1 Noordin Results: Case 1
Case 1 examines a uniform distribution of weight values including: w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and
w3 = 1. This case serves as a default if the user is unable to determine a logical ordering
for category importance. Consequently, this case represents equal importance amongst all
categories. We examine the subcase community graphs for case 1 in Figures 4.3, 4.5, and
4.7. We follow these graphs with the size and adjusted conductance per community subcase
plots in Figures 4.4, 4.6, and 4.8.
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Subcase	  1.1:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  
Communi'es	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  18%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  32%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  24%	  





Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  16%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  32%	  




Subcase	  1.2:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  	  
Subcase	  1.3:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Communi'es	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  18%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  32%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  24%	  




Figure 4.3: Noordin community output plot for subcases 1.1-1.3 with w1 = 1,
w2 = 1, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  1.1:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  
	  
Subcase	  1.2:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  	  















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	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   0	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Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Figure 4.4: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 1.1-1.3 with w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  1.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  	  	  
Communi'es	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  04%	  




Community12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community14:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community19:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community7: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  23%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  	  48%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  1.5:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Subcase	  1.6:	  ε	  =	  w1+	  w3	  
	  
Communi'es	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  04%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  	  	  20%	  
	  
	  
Figure 4.5: Noordin community output plot for subcases 1.4-1.6 with w1 = 1,
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  Conductance	  W	  















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Subcase	  1.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  	  
Subcase	  1.5:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  
	  
Subcase	  1.6:	  ε	  =	  w1+	  w3	  
2 12	  9 13	   418	   14	  1 315	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   010	  8 19	  11	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Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
2	   1 0 5 4 6 3	   7 M
Figure 4.6: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 1.4-1.6 with w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  1.7:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Communi'es	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community3: 	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
|Community|≤3:	  04%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  13%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  1.8:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Subcase	  1.9:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  
Communi'es	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  16%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  32%	  





Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community6: 	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
|Community|≤3:	  04%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  13%	  
	  
	  
Figure 4.7: Noordin community output plot for subcases 1.7-1.9 with w1 = 1,
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  Conductance	  O	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  1.7:	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  ≥	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  +	  w2	  
Subcase	  1.8:	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  ≥	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Figure 4.8: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 1.7-1.9 with w1 = 1, w2 = 1, and w3 = 1.
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Case 1 subcase graphs and plots provide an initial basis of comparison for the weighted cases
2 and 3. Due to equal weighting, some redundancy is observed in case 1. Algebraically,
w1 + w2 = 2 and w1 + w3 = 2 are equivalent. Consequently, we observe the same behavior
for subcases 1.2 and 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6, and 1.7 and 1.8. In Figure 4.6 we observe that
the ε = v subcases produce many small communities with relatively low conductance.
In particular, subcase 1.4 performed the poorest in terms of adjusted conductance and it
also has the highest misfit community. We also observe that the adjusted conductance W
values typically are higher than the adjusted conducted O. This is to be expected since
the communities were formed using the edges from W . By plotting the communities in
O, we no longer have the inferred edges we artificially attached during our community
detection process. The adjusted conductanceW values also tended to follow the same shape
as the adjusted conductance O values. After examining case 1, it appears that subcase 1.1
produces the best communities in terms of adjusted conductance when plotted in both W
and O.
4.2.2 Noordin Results: Case 2
Case 2 examines the weight distribution of w1 = 3, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1. This case
represents an established ordering of category importance. However, when both the LOC
and knowledge categories are included in the subcase, they are collectively equivalently
weighted to the trust category. Thus the trust category dominates individual categories, but
not the coalition of other categories. We examine the subcase community graphs for case
2 in Figures 4.9, 4.11, and 4.13. We follow these graphs with the size and conductance per
community subcase plots and summary tables in Figures 4.10, 4.12, and 4.14.
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Subcase	  2.1:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  
Communi'es	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  11%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  16%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  





Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  22%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  22%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  





Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  11%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  16%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community6: 	  	  	  	  08%	  




Subcase	  2.2:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  	  
Subcase	  2.3:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Figure 4.9: Noordin community output plot for subcases 2.1-2.3 with w1 = 3,
w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  2.1:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  
	  
Subcase	  2.2:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  	  















Adjusted	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  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  

















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
2	   0	  3	  4	  1	  6	   5	  
Figure 4.10: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 2.1-2.3 with w1 = 3, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  2.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  	  	  
Communi'es	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community6: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
Community10: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community14: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community4: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  02%	  




Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community9: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community4: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community7: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community13: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  	  09%	  




Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community16:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community0: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  28%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  	  37%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  2.5:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Subcase	  2.6:	  ε	  =	  w1+	  w3	  
	  Figure 4.11: Noordin community output plot for subcases 2.4-2.6 with w1 =
















Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Subcase	  2.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  	  
Subcase	  2.5:	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  +	  w2	  
	  
Subcase	  2.6:	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  =	  w1+	  w3	  















Adjusted	  Conductance	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Adjusted	  Conductance	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  Conductance	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Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	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Figure 4.12: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 2.4-2.6 with w1 = 3, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  2.7:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Communi'es	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community3: 	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
|Community|≤3:	  03%	  




Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community2: 	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  
Community3: 	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  01%	  




Community17:	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community14:	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community15:	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community6: 	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community16: 	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
|Community|≤3:	  11%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  25%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  2.8:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Subcase	  2.9:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  
Figure 4.13: Noordin community output plot for subcases 2.7-2.9 with w1 =
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  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Subcase	  2.7:	  ε	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  2.8:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w3	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Adjusted	  Conductance	  W	  
Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Figure 4.14: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 2.7-2.9 with w1 = 3, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Reviewing the results from case 2 allows us to make several observations in comparison
to case 1. Similar to case 1, in Figure 4.12 we observe that the ε = v subcases produce
many small communities with relatively low adjusted conductance. Again, subcase 1.4
performed the poorest in terms of adjusted conductance and it also has the highest misfit
community. However, we observe that subcases 1.5 and 1.6 produced a higher quantity of
smaller communities than in case 1. By imposing an ordering of weights on the categories
we have better defined the edges that belong to each category and consequently limited the
edges that are included when we build our weighted graphs and apply a threshold value.
As in case 1, the adjusted conductance W values typically are higher than the adjusted
conductedO. We also observe consistency in adjusted conductanceW values following the
same shape as the adjusted conductance O values. After examining case 2, it appears that
subcase 2.2 produces the best communities in terms of adjusted conductance when plotted
in bothW and O.
4.2.3 Noordin Results: Case 3
Case 3 examines an ordered distribution of weight values including: w1 = 4, w2 = 2, and
w3 = 1. This case is similar to case 2. However, when both the LOC and knowledge
categories are included in the subcase, they are collectively still less than the trust category.
Consequently, the trust category dominates individual categories and the coalition of other
categories. This distribution ofweights emphasizes greater importance for the trust category
than case 2. We examine the subcase community plots for case 3 in Figures 4.15, 4.17, and
4.7. We follow these plots with the size and conductance per community subcase plots and
summary tables in Figures 4.16, 4.18, and 4.20.
81
Subcase	  3.1:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  
Communi'es	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  21%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  





Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  16%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  23%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  25%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  





Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  19%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  24%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  01%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community6: 	  	  	  	  22%	  





Subcase	  3.2:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w2	  	  
Subcase	  3.3:	  ε	  ≤	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Figure 4.15: Noordin community output plot for subcases 3.1-3.3 with w1 =
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  2.1:	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  ≤	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  5	  	  	  	  	  2	  4	  
Figure 4.16: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 3.1-3.3 with w1 = 4, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  3.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  +	  w3	  	  	  
Communi'es	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community13: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
Community1: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community10: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community8: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  13%	  




Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community11:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community8: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community0: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community7: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community2: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  	  	  10%	  




Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community8: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community15:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
|Community|≤3:	  	  23%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  	  48%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  3.5:	  ε	  =	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Subcase	  3.6:	  ε	  =	  w1+	  w3	  
	  Figure 4.17: Noordin community output plot for subcases 3.4-3.6 with w1 =
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Adjusted	  Conductance	  O	  
Subcase	  3.4:	  ε	  =	  w1	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Subcase	  3.5:	  ε	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Subcase	  3.6:	  ε	  =	  w1+	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Figure 4.18: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 3.4-3.6 with w1 = 4, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Subcase	  3.7:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w2	  
Communi'es	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community2: 	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
|Community|≤3:	  03%	  




Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community1:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  08%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13%	  
Community8: 	  	  	  	  	  	  17%	  
Community4: 	  	  	  	  	  	  10%	  
|Community|≤3:	  03%	  




Community7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  03%	  
Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community9:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community16:	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community5: 	  	  	  	  	  06%	  
Community10:	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community11:	  	  	  	  	  	  05%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  07%	  
Community14: 	  	  	  	  	  	  09%	  
|Community|≤3:	  11%	  
Communitymisﬁt:	  	  	  25%	  
	  
	  
Subcase	  3.8:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  +	  w3	  
Subcase	  3.9:	  ε	  ≥	  w1	  
Figure 4.19: Noordin community output plot for subcases 3.7-3.9 with w1 =
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Figure 4.20: Noordin community size and normalized conductance for sub-
cases 3.7-3.9 with w1 = 4, w2 = 2, and w3 = 1.
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Reviewing the results from case 3 allows us to make several observations in comparison to
cases 1 and 2. Case 3 closely mimics the results from case 2. Increasing the importance of
the trust category caused onlyminor changes in the resultant community structure. However,
in general, these changes resulted in better adjusted conductance values for case 3. After
examining case 3, we determined that subcase 3.2 produces the best communities in terms
of adjusted conductance when plotted in bothW andO. This means that the combination of
trust and LOC, trust and knowledge, and each category individually produces topologically
better communities than the other combinations of categories.
4.2.4 Noordin Observations
Noordin is the largest of the three terrorist networks according to edge count, with a
relatively equal distribution of edges among the three categories. We summarize the results
of all three Noordin cases in Figure 4.21. The evidence from the Noordin cases supports
the observation that as the average community size increases, the average conductance
and cluster adequacy increases. We also consistently observed that ε = w1 + w2 + w3
produced a high volume of small and qualitatively poor communities. In general, the ε = v
threshold choices produced the poorest quality communities. On average, the more relaxed
the threshold choice, the better quality the community according to adjjusted conductance
and cluster adequacy. In terms of weight cases, we notice that case 1 reveals that an equal
distribution of weights actually produces, on average, high quality communities. However,
it is important to remember that many subcases from case 1 are redundant, thus we expect
many subcases to follow the same trend for case 1. For subcases 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.9, the
adjusted conductance and the cluster adequacy plotted in both the weighted graph and the
original monoplex out-preforms the control case. Recall that the control case also represents
an equal distribution in weights amongst all of the different layers. Thus, our results from
case 1 indicate that we can increase community quality by employing our methodology.
We also notice that case 3 slightly outperforms case 2. The highest adjusted conductance
value when plotted in the weighted graph results from subcase 3.2. This suggests that
heavily weighting a particular category, such as trust, potentially produces better quality
communities. We continue to monitor these observed trends in the Boko Harm and FARC
results to see if a pattern develops in general for dark networks. We offer an explanation for
these trends in Section 4.5.
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Case	  1:	  w1=	  1,	  w2	  =	  1,	  w3=	  1	  
	  
Case	  2:	  w1=	  3,	  w2	  =	  2,	  w3=	  1	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Figure 4.21: Average community size, average normalized conductance, and
cluster adequacy from communities plotted in O and W for Noordin cases
1-3.
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4.3 Boko Haram Results and Analysis
In this section we display the results and analysis of applying our methodology to the Boko
Haram Network. First we display our control case in Figure 4.22 and our results summary
case plots in Figure 4.23. We follow these plots with our observations for the Boko Haram
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  Conductance	  O	  
Communi*es	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27%	  
Community0:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20%	  
Community2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11%	  




6 9 10	   5 0 4 1 3 2 7 8
Figure 4.22: Community size and adjusted conductance for Boko Haram
control case.
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Case	  2:	  w1=	  3,	  w2	  =	  2,	  w3=	  1	  
	  
Case	  3:	  w1=	  4,	  w2	  =	  2,	  w3=	  1	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Figure 4.23: Average community size, average adjusted conductance, and
cluster adequacy for Boko Haram cases 1-3.
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4.3.1 Boko Haram Observations
The Boko Haram Network is much sparser and more disconnected than the Noordin Net-
work. However, each category contains a relatively equal amount of edges. Notice that
the control case is already partitioned due to the high number of components and light
external connectivity between communities. As a consequence, we do not expect large
improvements to community quality by applying our methodology. The control case in
Figure 4.22 reveals 11 communities. Three of these communities are larger and the re-
maining eight communities are of size three or smaller. We observe similar behavior to
Noordin for communities that are also components for perfect adjusted conductance. In the
largest connected component, communit y6 and communit y9 have the worst conductance
since there have a high number of external connections relative to the internal connections
within their respective communities. For example, communit y6 has only one connection
inside the community, but has four connections outside the community communit y4 and
communit y0. Since communit y6 has poor adjusted conductance, placing these vertices in
the misfit community has the potential for increasing the average quality of the remaining
communities.
In Figure 4.23 we observe similar trends as the Noordin Network. We continue to observe
that ε = w1 + w2 + w3 provides the poorest quality communities as the intersection of
the communities in all three categories. The ε ≤ cases continue to generally produce
the best quality communities. However, we observe more variance in the ordering of
the subcases between the cases. The general trend of community quality increasing with
average community size continues for Boko Haram.
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4.4 FARC Results and Analysis
In this section we display the results and analysis of applying our methodology to the FARC
Network. First we display our control case in Figure 4.24 and our results summary case
plots in Figure 4.25. We follow these plots with our observations for the Boko Haram
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  O	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Community6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33%	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  04%	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  10%	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  09%	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  05%	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  04%	  
Community4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  04%	  
Community3:	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Figure 4.24: Community size and adjusted conductance for FARC control
case.
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Case	  1:	  w1=	  1,	  w2	  =	  1,	  w3=	  1	  
	  
Case	  2:	  w1=	  3,	  w2	  =	  2,	  w3=	  1	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Figure 4.25: Average community size, average adjusted conductance, and
cluster adequacy for FARC cases 1-3.
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4.4.1 FARC Observations
The FARC Network is dominated in edge distribution by the LOC category. This category
accounts for more than 98% of the edges. The clear hierarchy between organizations is
visible in the control case in Figure 4.24. Notice that the control case produces very high
quality communities. There are a total of nine communities. Notice that communit y7 is
dense internally and only has one external connection. This structure allows communit y7
to have excellent adjusted conductance. These near component communities follow the
similar trends by component communities found in Noordin and Boko Haram.
In Figure 4.25 we observe that some threshold cases did not result in communities. This is
a product of the edge distribution in the three categories. Since there are no communities
in ε = w1 + w2 + w3, this means that the same edge relationship does not exist in all three
categories. We also observe a much more dramatic shift in the quality of communities as
we transition from ε ≥ subcases to ε ≤ subcases. The domination of the LOC category
makes it difficult to produce quality communities when LOC is not included.
4.5 General Observations
Through our analysis of the three terrorist networks we identified the following common
observations. The two different community quality metrics were relatively consistent in
their evaluation of each subcase. This consistency indicates that the metrics could provide
substantial evidence in determining the quality of the communities in absence of ground
truth. For average adjusted conductance, we identified the community strength relative to
the remainder of the network. For modularity, we evaluated community strength relative to
the expected connections in a random graph. We further refined modularity using cluster
adequacy to determine the strength of the graph relative to the best possible modularity
based on partitioning the network into m communities. The consistency in these metrics is
critical to our analysis of identifying the best quality communities from the subcases.
The control case cluster adequacy and adjusted conductance values were typically very high
when compared to the other subcases, yet several subcases still performed better. Recall that
the control case represents aggregating all of the information into a single weighted graph,
which results in the loss of detailed information that is inherent to each layer. Consequently,
a connection in the control graph means two vertices are related, but we no longer have
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the available information to distinguish how they are related. Our subcases methodically
aggregate layers that are similar in meaning to manage the information loss problem of
aggregating the entire network. Choosing a weight case and threshold subcase allows the
user to determine which categories to include, and how important they are to the analytical
goals. For example, small communities may not be the best quality, but they may be easier
to target. While not the focus here, Chapter 5 and 6 discuss this possibility in greater depth.
Generally, as the average size of the communities increased, the adjusted average con-
ductance and the cluster adequacy values increased as well. This indicates that fewer
communities of larger size is more optimal for the dark networks we have studied. How-
ever, as discussed previously in section 4.2.2, the size of the community becomes irrelevant
if the community is a component of the network. Communities that are also characterized
as components have no external edges to the community, which results in perfect adjusted
conductance.
Our hypothesis that ε = v would produce many small and poor quality communities was
supported by the results of all three networks based on the two metrics used. Placing this
high restriction on the community development forced the communities to remain small.
Embedding these small communities in the weighted graph and the original monoplex
revealed their poor quality. The external connections that were ignored during the com-
munity development process of applying thresholds become very important in determining
community quality. For example, notice that communit y0 from Noordin subcase 3.6 in
Figure 4.17 is a small 4-vertex community. At most, this community can have six internal
connections. Yet, when these community members are plotted back into the monoplex, we
notice a large number of external connections to other communities, including the misfits.
As a result, both adjusted conductance and cluster adequacy rank this community as poor
in quality in Figure 4.18.
In most cases, the subcases with the highest average adjusted conductance and cluster
adequacy came from the threshold choice of ε ≤ v , which was the most relaxed of all of
the thresholds and did not contain any misfit vertices. This is surprising considering our
initial claim that threshold choices of ε ≥ v would produce the best quality communities.
Community quality instead increased as the restriction of the threshold cases was relaxed.
It is important to note that under these relaxed conditions, every vertex was assigned to a
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community and no vertices were labelled misfits. We assumed that by placing vertices in
a misfit group, the overall quality of the community would increase. These misfits are still
connected in the graph when our cluster adequacy and adjusted conductance are calculated.
Boko Haram case 1.9 demonstrated that physically removing misfit vertices from the graph
does have the potential to increase the quality of the communities. In this subcase, the
vertices in communit y6 from Figure 4.22 were re-designated as misfits, which removed it
from consideration in averaging the adjusted conductance values of the communities.
In this chapter, we have identified the best quality communities based on average adjusted
conductance and cluster adequacy, as we had no ground truth community. Based on these
metrics, case 1 generally performed the best, yet the best overall subcase for Noordin was
subcase 3.2. However, we return to our definition of KSC to verify that we have successfully
identified the best possible communities for network disruption. Our intuition still points
to subcase 3.9 because it provides the necessary bias for the trust foundation category to
dominant the remaining community information from the other categories. At this point,
we are unable to determine if the best quality community is indicative of a meaningful
community as described by the KSC. To explore this, we model the Noordin Network in
Chapter 5 as a network flow problem and examine the community properties in detail for
subcase 3.9 to build community targeting profiles to disrupt the network.
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In this chapterwe develop an optimizationmodel for theNoordinNetwork using Pyomo [56],
which is a python software package from Sandia Labs. We begin with some background
information and an explanation of our network flowmodel formulation. Next, we present the
optimal attack results for network disruption. We then examine the community properties
from subcase 3.9 to refine our disruption strategy and compare performance results against
the control attack plan.
5.1 Model Formulation
According to Ahuja et al. [57], minimum cost network flow problems involve some type
of resource or commodity that exists as a supply for some set of vertices and as a demand
for another set of vertices. The objective of these problems is to transport commodities
from supply to demand in the most efficient manner possible without violating a given set
of constraints. There are a myriad of different approaches to transforming a network into
a network flow problem. According to Carlyle [58], one technique for optimizing network
flow involves building and interdicting the shortest path algorithm. He explains that the
shortest path algorithm calculates the shortest distance between a source or set of source
vertices and a destination or set of destination vertices. Alderson et al. [59] represent the
shortest path formulation between a designated initial start vertex, s, and a terminal vertex,





ci jXi j, (5.1)
where ci j is the cost assigned to the edge between vertex i and j and Xi j is a binary variable,
which represents flow along edge (i, j). Xi j is equal to one if the edge (i, j) is on the shortest
path and is equal to zero otherwise.
Equation 5.1 essentially means we are adding up the length or cost of all of the edges along
the shortest path to produce a total cost amount. The objective of this linear program is to
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minimize the total cost to flow or transport a commodity or resource from s to t. Alderson








1 if i = s
0 if i , s, t ∀i ∈ N
−1 if i = t,
(5.2)
Xi j ≥ 0, (5.3)
where Xi j is the flow into the vertex j and X ji is the flow out of the vertex j.
These constraints ensure the flow at each vertex in the network is properly balanced and
that all flow is non-negative. To interdict the network, Alderson et al. [59] define a new set







(ci j + qi jYi j )Xi j, (5.4)
where qi j is the associated penalty for attacking the edge (i, j) and Yi j is a binary variable
that equals one when edge (i, j) is attacked, and zero otherwise.
Alderson et al. [59] point out that there are two competing objectives represented in Equa-
tion 5.4. The network defender continues to desire the shortest possible path in order to
minimize cost. Conversely, the network attacker’s goal is to maximize the length of the
shortest path to maximize the cost and consequently, the damage to the network. Alderson
et al. [59] define the following additional constraints for the attacker problem:
∑
(i, j)∈A
Yi j ≤ max_num_attacks, (5.5)
Yi j ∈ {0, 1}. (5.6)
These constraints ensure the optimal number of attacks is chosen to be equal to or less
than a specified number by the attacker. Alderson et al. reveal that a problem that
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simultaneously maximizes and minimizes the objective function cannot be directly solved
as a linear program. To remedy this difficulty, they explains that for a fixed attack plan, the
minimization problem can be transformed into the dual maximization problem.
According to Ahuja et al. [57], the max-flow min-cut theorem states that:
the maximum value of the flow from s to t equals the minimum capacity of all
s − t cuts.
Since an optimal solution exists for our original primal problem, the theorem of strong
duality states that an optimal solution for the dual problem must exist as well. Alderson
et al. exploit this property by transforming the primal attacker problem into a dual integer
linear program where the objective function is represented as:
max
pi,Y
pis − pit, (5.7)
where pis and pit represent a relative distance between s and t.
The dual objective function allows us to maximize the distance between s and t. This
relative distance increases when edges are attacked. For a detailed explanation on how to
build the dual problem from the existing primal problem see Brown et al. [60]. After some
simplification, Brown et al. represent the attacker dual constraints as:
pii − pi j − qi jYi j ≤ ci j ∀(i, j) ∈ A, (5.8)∑
(i, j)∈A
Yi j ≤ max_num_attacks, (5.9)
Yi j ∈ {0, 1}, (5.10)
pii unrestricted, (5.11)
pis ≡ 0. (5.12)
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Alderson et al. [59] explain that formulating the shortest path interdiction problem results
in a linear optimization problem that seeks to increase the length of the shortest path from
the supply vertices to the demand vertices. In the next section, we apply the shortest path
interdiction dual formulation to the Noordin Network.
5.2 Noordin Formulation
We developed a scenario that exploits Noordin’s documented success in coordinating be-
tween the five major terrorist organization in Indonesia. Under this scenario, Noordin is
planning a joint attack with the support of the major terrorist organizations in Indonesia.
To model this coordination, Noordin represents our start vertex with a commodity supply
of information. His objective is to optimize the flow of information to the key tactical
leaders from Darul Islam, KOMPAK, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Ring Banten Group. The
corresponding set of destination vertices, D, from these terrorist groups is:
D = {’Kang Jaja’, ’Aris Munandar’, ’Ali Imron’, ’Iwan Dharmawan’}. (5.13)
The attacker in this case is represented by our established user in Chapter 3, JIEDDO. The
attacker objective is interrupt the flow of information by attacking the optimal combination
of edges that maximize the sum of the lengths of the shortest paths from Noordin to the
elements in the set D. Here, the cost of each edge is represented as increments of time in
hours. For example, a path that is 24 units long corresponds to a message delay of 24 hours
or one day. Attacking an edge corresponds to less invasive actions such as jamming cell
phone capabilities, which, given time, can be overcome by actions such physically meeting
with the person. However, this time delay has the potential to disrupt the coordination of a
planned attack. The edges used to build this model are extracted from the LOC and Trust
categories as described in Table 3.4.
It is important to note that the LOC category only includes 120 of the total 133 terrorists
and 318 of the 2451 total connections. Here we extend Krebs idea of the trust relationship
importance to improve the realism of our model and increase the number of terrorists and
available connections to 128 and 598 respectively. Another aspect we must consider is
that network flow problems require directed networks. To model this requirement in the
Noordin undirected data set, we create parallel edges, in the opposite direction, for each
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pair of vertices. This results in doubling the number of available edges to 1196.
Given the importance of trust, it is feasible to infer additional communication edges using
existing trust relationships. For example, two terrorists who were friends in school, may
not have any documented terrorist activity communication between them. However, if
an existing point of contact is unable to be reached, the terrorist can potentially activate a
dormant relationship, such as trust, to reestablish communication. Using this theory, we can
enhance our network model’s resilience and robustness capability using the trust category
edges. If an edge between two vertices is attacked, then the vertices have the option of
formulating new communication channels using the trust category edges. By rewarding
redundant connections between terrorists, our model reflects choosing the path with more
familiar relationships over a path between vertices with a single acquaintance.
To model this capability, we added some of the edges from the trust category to the
model, but incorporated the desired secondary availability of trust edges by establishing a
cost hierarchy. Under this hierarchy, costs for edges in both LOC and trust categories were
calculated by subtracting the total number of LOC edges, w2i j , and trust edges, w1i j , between
i and j from the value 13. The value 13 was chosen because the max(w2i j + w1i j ) = 12,
which results in a range of edge costs between 1 and 12. This construct rewards two
terrorists who have multiple connections for trust and LOC by lowering the cost value of
communicating with each other.
The next case in our cost hierarchy is LOC connections only. Similar to LOC and trust,
LOC connections only simply subtracts the total number of LOC edges, w2i j from the values
13, which results in cost values between 5 and 12. In an effort to delay the use of trust
only edges, the total number of trust only edges, w1i j , between i and j was subtracted from
the value 24, which results in a range of edge costs between 21 and 23. The value 24 was
chosen since it results in a range of cost values that is higher than LOC only and LOC and
trust, yet lower than the penalty cost. We established a uniform arbitrarily high penalty
cost of qi j = 50, when edges are attacked. As a result, this model always favors the edges
according to the established cost hierarchy in calculating the shortest path. For comparison,
we also created a uniform cost dictionary that weighted each edge as one regardless of the
category or redundant edges within a category.
We conducted 16 attack scenarios, each corresponding to an increase in the available
103
number of attacks by one from 0 to 15. Figure 5.1 depicts the resultant parametric curves
from executing the attack scenarios. The number of attacks is displayed on the x-axis and
the corresponding shortest path distance is displayed on the y-axis for the uniform and
hierarchical cost values. To solve this linear program, we used a commercial solver called
Gurobi [61]. According to Meindl et al. [62], commercial optimization solvers such as
CPLEX and Gurobi outperform open source solvers in both speed and accuracy.
Figure 5.1: Cost in hours for attack plans in uniform and hierarchical cost
models.
Notice in Figure 5.1 that the hierarchical cost scenario results in a relatively linear increase
in the cost hours as the number of attacks increase. However, the rate of increase slows
slightly after nine attacks. Conversely, the uniform cost scenario results in three noticeable
plateaus at zero, five, and nine attacks. Since all edges are equally weighted for cost, the
only noticeable increase occurs when vertices become completely disconnected. Under this
scenario, the shortest path interdiction algorithm simply attacks the edges connected to the
demand vertices in order of smallest to largest degree. Thus at attack number five, all edges
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connecting to Ali Imron have been targeted resulting in the maximum penalty of 50. The
algorithm then begins targeting all of the connections to Aris Munandar until he becomes
disconnected at nine attacks. In the next section, we analyze the community properties of
subcase 3.9 to enhance the attack strategy.
5.3 Community Properties and Attack Strategy
Subcase 3.9 was chosen to examine in depth due to its inclusion of (i) trust and (ii) trust and
LOC edges. However, this subcase does not completely reflect the edges chosen to model
the network flow problem. Subcase 3.9 does not include LOC only edges and includes
extra edges from (i) trust and knowledge and (ii) trust, LOC, and knowledge combined. Yet,
subcase 3.9 provides the best approximation for the network flowsmodel out of the available
threshold cases while still maintaining a relatively high average community quality value.
For each community, we examined the following properties: Size, Density (De), Total
External Edge Count (TEEC), Total Internal Edge Count (TIEC), Number of Demand
Vertices (NDV), Adjusted Conductance O (φ1), Influence (I), Community Influence (CI),
and Total Influence (TI), which are summarized in Table 5.1. We also examined Between
Community Edge Count (BCEi j), which is summarized in Table 5.2.
The community density is calculated by dividing the actual number of internal edges in the
community by the maximum possible number of edges in the community. The maximum
possible number of undirected edges for a clique is n · n−12 . To model this number for our
converted directed network, we multiplied this value by two. It is important to note that our
modification to the density equation is only possible because for every edge (i,j) there is a
corresponding edge (j,i) in the network. For a community with n vertices, and |E | edges,
we represent community density as:
De =
|E |
n · (n − 1) . (5.14)
The TEEC refers to the total number of edges that begin with a vertex in the community and
terminate with a vertex outside the community. TIEC refers to the total number of edges
that begin and end within vertices inside the community. The NDV is a count of the total
number of verticeswithin the community that have a demand for the information commodity.
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Between Community Edge Count calculates the total number of external edges from the
source community to each destination community. For example, for communit y0, the value
for BCE09 is calculated by counting the number of edges that originate in communit y0 and
terminate in communit y9.
The Influence is calculated by summing the ratio of BCEi j of the source community to
the TEECj of each terminal community. For a fixed source community, i and a terminal







Influence allows us to determine how important the terminal community views the source
community relative to the total number of external connections from the terminal community
to the whole network. For example, if person A is friends with person B and person B only
has three friends total, then person A’s influence is 13 . However, if person B only has one
friend, then person A increases their influence to 11 . We calculate CI by totaling the number
of communities connected to the source community. The TI is calculated as their sum:
T I = I + CI . (5.16)
Figure 5.2 summarizes four of the community properties including Size, TI, De, and φ1. The
community names are displayed in order of increasing TI on the x-axis. Community size is
represented as blue diamonds and TI is represented as green triangles on the primary left
y-axis. Density is represented as purple squares, and φ1 is represented as red circles on the
secondary right y-axis. We observe that the community density and adjusted conductance
generally follow the same shape. Additionally, the total community influence generally
increases as the size of the community increases.
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Table 5.1: Subcase 3.9 community properties.
Name Size De TEEC TIEC NDV φ1 I CI TI
3 2 0.50 0 2 0 1.000 0.000 0 0.000
6 4 1.00 2 12 0 0.800 0.014 2 2.014
0 10 0.56 7 90 0 0.672 0.045 2 2.045
5 2 0.50 5 2 0 0.286 0.064 2 2.064
7 13 0.32 31 50 1 0.334 0.312 4 4.312
4 13 0.40 69 62 0 0.378 0.778 5 5.778
1 10 0.40 77 36 1 0.401 1.109 5 6.109
2 17 0.21 58 58 1 0.401 1.313 5 6.313
9 17 0.35 122 96 0 0.287 2.010 8 10.010
8 23 0.41 164 206 1 0.451 4.018 9 13.018
misfit 20 0.04 29 16 0 NA 0.349 5 5.349
Table 5.2: Subcase 3.9 community total influence summary.
Name BCEi0 BCEi1 BCEi2 BCEi3 BCEi4 BCEi5 BCEi6 BCEi7 BCEi8 BCEi9
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1
5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
7 0 12 0 0 3 0 0 0 9 7
4 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 3 36 10
1 0 0 5 0 8 0 0 12 18 29
2 0 5 0 0 8 3 0 0 23 10
9 1 29 10 0 10 0 1 7 62 0
8 6 18 23 0 36 2 1 9 0 62
Misfit 0 5 9 0 4 0 0 0 9 2
The least influential and smallest community is communit y3. This makes sense since
communit y3 is a component community and thus is isolated and incapable of influencing
other communities. Not surprisingly, Noordin Top belongs to the largest community with
the greatest total influence, communit y8. The tactical commanders he is sending his or-
ders to are each in separate demand communities including: communit y1, communit y2,
communit y7, and communit y8. As we examine the properties of these demand commu-
nities, we notice that communit y7 is the least influential, which means it is more isolated
than the other communities. We hypothesize that the more isolated the community, the
more vulnerable it will be to edge attacks. As a result, we can prioritize targeting edges that
connect the source community to the demand communities in increasing order of influence.
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Figure 5.2: Subcase 3.9 community properties.
Another approach to using community information in the network is to reduce the complexity
of the current attack plan. As seen in Equation 5.8, every edge represents an additional
constraint, and consequently, more computations. The current Noordin Model has a total
of 1196 edges. We believe that attacks should be primarily focused on edges inside
communities that contain demand vertices and on edges that connect these communities to
the remainder of the network. Given this logic, we can reduce the communities without a
demand vertex to representation as a single vertex. Under this construct, the internal edges
of communit y0, communit y3, communit y4, communit y5, communit y6, communit y9 and
communit ymis f it are considered defended and not available for attack. This reduces the
number of edges subject to attack calculations to 628 from the original 1196. We consider
the communities with demand as priority for analysis, and the remainder of the network as
noise that can be ignored. As a result, we implement the shortest path interdiction algorithm
on the simplified representation of the network. The goal of this simplification is to achieve
similar damage, but to reduce the computation time. According to Lundh [63], the python
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time module can be used to benchmark the run time of an algorithm. For our purposes,
the time module recorded the elapsed time required for Gurobi to solve the shortest path





















Figure 5.3: Noordin original and simplified attack models.
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To model removing these edges from attack consideration, we place a large cost of 100 on
the internal edges of the designated communities, and place a penalty cost equal to zero.
Consequently, these edges will never be considered for the shortest path, and they will never
be attacked.
In the top diagram in Figure 5.3 we arranged the vertices in the Noordin Network ac-
cording to community and distance away from Noordin. The red color corresponds to
communit y0, the yellow color corresponds to communit y1, the light green color corre-
sponds to communit y2, the gray color corresponds to communit y3, the dark blue color
corresponds to communit y4, the dark green color corresponds to communit y5, the orange
color corresponds to communit y6, the light blue color corresponds to communit y7, the
purple color corresponds to communit y8, the pink color corresponds to communit y9, and
the black color corresponds to communit ymis f it . Using the same color scheme, the bottom
diagram in Figure 5.3 illustrates our method of collapsing communities into single vertices
that do not contain a demand vertex. Demand vertices are represented by a red negative
one and an orange hexagon. The supply vertex, Noordin Top, is represented by a black four
and a green hexagon. Vertices are further organized into groups according to the number
of hops, D, that they are away from Noordin Top, where D ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The results of attacking the Noordin Network using the optimal attack strategy with uniform
costs on all edges are displayed in Figure 5.4. We refer to the optimal attack as the results
from directly applying the shortest path interdiction algorithm to the Noordin Network
flow model. The community guided attack refers to the modified attack we implemented
by simplifying the Noordin Network flow model based on community partitions. On the
primary left y-axis, the optimal uniform cost is represented as purple squares with a solid
line and the community guided uniform cost is represented as a red x with a dotted black
line. The cost is represented in units of hours. On the secondary right y-axis, the optimal
uniform cost time and community guided cost times to execute the algorithm are represented
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Figure 5.4: Uniform cost results.
Weobserve that the uniform cost for the optimal and community guided attacks are identical.
Notice the spike in the amount of time to calculate the optimal attack strategy for four attacks.
Another spike, though considerably smaller, is also visible for the optimal attack strategy
for four attacks as well. As the attack number is increased from nine to 15, we observe a
seemingly exponential increase in the time to execute the algorithm. As we increased the
attack number beyond 15 to 16 we noticed a dramatic increase in the run time for the optimal
attack from 10.19 to 113.20 seconds. However, 16 community guided attacks resulted in a
nominal change from 0.40 to 0.39.
We attempted to execute a 50 attack scenario for the optimal attack, but the solver timed
out after 30 minutes without determining an optimal solution. However, the community
guided attack did determine an an optimal solution after only 0.39 seconds. Generally, we
observe an increase in the run time of the algorithm as the cost value plateaus with a spike
occurring right before a large increase in cost. We also observe that the community guided
uniform cost time is virtually horizontal. This supports our assessment that communities
can be used to reduce the complexity of the problem while achieving the same results.
The results of attacking the Noordin Network using the optimal attack strategy with hier-
archical costs on all edges are displayed in Figure 5.5. The optimal hierarchical cost and
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community guided cost produce perform similarly. However, the community guided cost
does slightly out perform the optimal cost at several attacks including the final attack case.
Yet, there are a few instances where the community guided cost is lower than the optimal.
To understand these discrepancies, the Gurobi reference manual [61] reveals that Gurobi has






















































Figure 5.5: Hierarchical cost results.
Brown et al. [60] state that the optimal solution occurs when the difference gap between
upper and lower bounds is ideally zero. However, this could prove to take an inordinate
amount of time. Relative optimality criteria allows the user to choose the level of accuracy
of the optimal solution at the expense of time. It is possible that this default optimality
criteria gap caused the solutions to vary slightly between optimal and community guided
approaches.
We observe for the hierarchical algorithm times, that both optimal and community guided
run times follow a gradual increase until attack nine where the slope increase sharply
for the optimal strategy attack strategy. We also attempted a 50 attack scenario for the
optimal cost, but the solver timed out after 30 minutes without determining an optimal
solution. However, the community guided cost determined an optimal solution after only
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10.31 seconds. Similar to the uniform cost results, the hierarchical cost results support
simplifying the network model using the community partitions for similar cost values and
reduced algorithm performance times. Additionally, simplifying the model potentially
allows the user to reduce the optimality criteria for a more precise optimal solution.
In this chapter we demonstrated one potential use for exploiting community properties to
disrupt terrorist networks. In the final chapter, Chapter 6, we discuss improvements to both
the community detection algorithm and modeling the network as a network flow problem.
Additionally, we discuss some general observations and recommendations for continuing
this research in the future.
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CHAPTER 6:
Future Work and Recommendations
In this thesis we have presented a community detection algorithm for multiplex dark net-
works. We have also demonstrated the utility of partitioning a network into communities
to disrupt network functionality. Given our results, we provide some future direction in
this chapter for improving our community detection algorithm, enhancing our network flow
model, and alternative strategies for disrupting networks using communities. Finally, we
summarize the key findings from this thesis and offer some general conclusions.
6.1 Community Detection Algorithm Improvements
In this section we discuss improving the community detection algorithm based upon our
current results. We suggest a procedure for selecting layers, determining category weights
in Subsection 6.1.1. We also discuss the effect of removing misfit vertices from the graph
on community quality in Subsection 6.1.2, and some recommendations for applying the
algorithm to multiplex networks with complete information in Subsection 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Layer and Category Importance
Our community detection algorithm requires user input for selecting layers from an available
data set. For the dark networks we examined, we selected layers based on similar meaning.
However, some networks may not be as easily sorted, and user intuition on layer selection
may not be as obvious. This problem is particularly difficult for large data sets with many
layers.
Sharma et al. [64] suggest that one technique for selecting layers is to determine the relative
importance of each layer. His approach focuses on the impact of missing data with respect
to network modeling. They asserts that missing information or data has a more profound
effect upon the analysis conducted on multiplex networks than other types of network
models. One of the metrics he uses is called exclusive relevance. This metric determines
the importance of a particular layer, L, based upon the fraction of connections from a node,
n, to the nodes adjacent to n in L. Crawford et al. [65] explored the concept of network
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layer importance by examining the contribution of a layer with respect to final community
structure of a graph.
Recall from Section 2.3, Taylor et al. [29] proclaim that layer aggregation is extremely
beneficial for network analysis if conducted appropriately. They asserts that one of the
fundamental problems of layer aggregation is determining which layers to aggregate. They
believe that using all of the available layers of a network can actually over-model a network.
Over-modeling refers to threshold at which the amount of information used to model the
system hinders the analysis. Taylor et al. explain that over-modeling leads to computational
and memory storage difficulties. They suggests that repetitive layers should be aggre-
gated to more concisely represent the network. Their work supports the idea of increased
detectability of communities in a network when layers are aggregated.
In [65] the authors establish additional criteria for layer aggregation using community
evolution to determinewhich layers or set of layers are dominant in the network for producing
communities. They examined the same three dark terrorist networks as this thesis, as well
as two transportation networks. They used Normalized Mutual Information (NMI), purity,
density, and modularity as metrics for comparing our resultant community evolution cases
to the established ground truth communities from the layer aggregation.
The key findings in [65] were that layer uniqueness and edge density were themost important
factors in assigning importance to layers and categories. The knowledge category was the
dominant category for the Noordin Network. Recall that the knowledge category accounts
for more than 50% of the edges in the Noordin data set, thus it is expected to be the most
dominant category. However, combining knowledge category layers with trust category
layers resulted in the most accurate approximation of ground truth communities. The trust
category represents many of the social relationships, which suggests that the community
structure of social relationships is unique.
The research of [65] implies that uniqueness and edge density are important factors when
determining which layers or categories are dominant in the data set. Their research requires
further verification on other types of networks, but identifying layers that are both dense
and unique in structure is a promising method for layer selection and inclusion for analytical
purposes. However, while density is easily calculated, uniqueness is a more difficult quality
to evaluate prior to conducting the layer dominance procedure.
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This concept could be applied to category importance to determine an appropriate weight
for each category in step 5 of our community detection algorithm. To extend this thesis,
the dominant set of layers from each category could be selected to model the Noordin
Network. Additionally, the categories could be weighted according order of dominance
explained in [65]: knowledge, trust, and then LOC. For more details on the layer and
category dominance results of the three dark networks see [65].
6.1.2 Misfit Community Elimination
Another modification to our community detection algorithm involves removing the misfit
vertices from the network. In Chapter 4, our results revealed that the networks with larger
misfit communities tended to produce poorer quality communities according to adjusted
conductance and cluster adequacy. We initially believed removing vertices with high
external connections would increase the community quality value. However, since the
misfit vertices are still part of the graph, the communities external connections remain as
high or higher that reduces the adjusted conductance score. Also, by removing vertices from
the community, the community loses some of the valuable internal connections that cluster
adequacy favors. Simply labeling a vertex as a misfit is not enough to benefit increased
community quality. As an extension to this thesis, we recommend physically eliminating
misfits and all of their associated connection from the graph. The resultant graph would
be considerably less complex and produce higher quality communities according to our
established metrics. We performed an initial localized experiment on the Noordin Network
case 3 to demonstrate the potential benefits of pursuing this extension.
We explored misfit elimination for the Noordin Network case 3 and compared it to our
original community quality results for average adjusted conductance, φ1, and cluster ade-
quacy for plotting communities in the original graph. We subtracted the values produced
by eliminating the misfits from the results where misfits remained present to produce the
change in values, ∆. These results are summarized in Table 6.1.
Notice that some of the subcase average adjusted conductance and cluster adequacy values
did not change. This is because there are no identified misfits in these subcases. A
preliminary analysis of the results suggests that physically removing misfit vertices from
the network always improves the quality of the community according to cluster adequacy and
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Table 6.1: Noordin case 3 misfit elimination ∆.













1 0.578 0.214 0.578 0.214 0.000 0.000
2 0.602 0.244 0.602 0.244 0.000 0.000
3 0.578 0.226 0.578 0.226 0.000 0.000
4 0.149 0.049 0.191 0.096 0.047 0.042
5 0.242 0.054 0.295 0.085 0.031 0.053
6 0.162 0.057 0.213 0.118 0.060 0.051
7 0.263 0.082 0.303 0.111 0.029 0.040
8 0.383 0.143 0.419 0.173 0.031 0.036
9 0.501 0.157 0.520 0.188 0.032 0.019
average adjusted conductance. The greatest improvements generally increased for subcases
4, 5, and 6, which had the largest populations of misfits with 64, 47, and 68 respectively.
These results need to be compared with other cases and networks to verify the trends we
identified with our preliminary analysis.
Throughout this thesis, theNoordinNetworkwas the primary focus for in-depth analysis. We
can continue dissecting the Noordin data set using different thresholds, weights, categories,
and layer combinations. All of the recommendations and applications should also be applied
to the Boko Haram, and FARC networks. Additionally, the results need to be confirmed
with other classified dark network data sets. To demonstrate the flexibility of the community
detection algorithm, we need to apply our methodology to a variety of networks.
6.1.3 Complete Information Multiplex Networks
This thesis has focused on dark networks where incomplete information is an inherent and
challenging property. However, partitioning non dark networks into communities is also
useful for analysis. For example, a group of NPS students in a class may be represented as a
multiplex network with layers representing different skill sets. In this case, the PDC would
be equivalent to a group project team. By sorting the students into different communities
based upon skills, the professor can easily identify and build modular project teams that are
balanced in terms of a wide spectrum of capabilities. In this example, all of the information
used to construct the network is already available. We can apply our algorithm to networks,
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such as this example, which contain complete information. For these networks, the only
recommended change is to remove the clique conversion instruction from step 4 of the
algorithm. Converting the communities into cliques serves no logical purpose for inferring
edges when all of the edges are already known. In the next section, we explore some
alternative modeling practices that could enhance the model described in Chapter 5.
6.2 Network Flow Model Enhancements
In this section we discuss two improvements to our network flow model focused more
realistically modeling the terrorist network. These improvements includemodeling invasive
attacks, and defender capabilities.
6.2.1 Invasive Attacks
In Chapter5 we focused on attacking edges between vertices. These attacks equated to
non-invasive actions such as jamming cell phone communication or indirectly affecting
the terrorist’s ability to communicate by causing a route to be blocked or closed. It is
conceivable that non-invasive attacks can be implemented at a higher volume and low risk
to the attacker. However, if more direct action is desired, we can model an invasive attack
that would mean physically removing or capturing an individual in the network. To model
the removal of a vertex, Alderson et al. [59] suggest vertex splitting. Vertex splitting is a
method for representing each vertex as a additional edge in the data set. Of course, this
increases the number of edges, |E |, in the model by the number of vertices, n. Figure 6.1
demonstrates how a green vertex i can be replaced by a pair of vertices, i′, which is red, and
i′′, which is yellow, and an edge, (i′, i′′), between i′ and i′′.
Notice how all of the edges flowing into i are now attached to vertex i′, and that the edges
flowing out of vertex i are now connected to i′′. To model attacking vertex i, we can
now attack edge (i′, i′′). This modification to the data set allows the attacker to attack the
best combination of edges and vertices in the graph. Attacking a vertex can be extremely
effective by disrupting multiple connections with one attack. However, direct attacks, such
as removing vertices, should be more restrictive and costly for the attacker to execute.
For example, the number of attacks could be constrained as a function of invasive, y and
non-invasive, y′ attacks such that:
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Figure 6.1: Vertex splitting example.
num_attacks = 2y + y′. (6.1)
Equation 6.1 allows the attacker to choose an optimal combination of invasive and non-
invasive attacks for a given number of available attacks with the understanding that invasive
attacks are twice as resource depleting as non-invasive attacks. Constraining the attack
resources in this manner adds realism to the difficulty and risk associated with direct action
verses indirect actions.
The knowledge of which vertices are involved in the shortest paths is also valuable for
analysis. For example, if invasive action is not possible, and the message cannot be blocked
by less invasivemeasures, it is still possible to gather valuable intelligence bymonitoring the




Our model primarily focused on the attacker’s resources and capabilities to interdict the
network. However, in reality, an intelligent defender understands their own network vulner-
abilities and, given a finite amount of resources, strengthens these weaknesses accordingly.
Alderson et al. [59] recommend formulating the defender model to strengthen existing
connections or potentially build new connections in the network. In the Noordin network,
forging new relationships could represent sending more individuals to planning meetings or
forcing individuals to train more together to potentially build friendship and stronger work-
ing relationships. However, Krebs [39] reveals that building too many new connections
could come at the costly expense of secrecy.
Defending an individual could have a more physical representation such as placing him in a
safe house with armed guards or constantly moving his location. Alderson et al. [59] believe
that an intelligent defender can mitigate the effects of a network attack by incorporating a
new binary decision variable into our existing model, wi j , which is equal to one if a new
connection between terrorists is forged, and zero otherwise. Alderson et al. [59] explain










2(yi j + y ji)xi j, (6.2)
where xi j is the attacker’s decision to attack edge (i, j), yts is an artificial flow variable that
connects the source, s, to the demand vertices, t, yi j is the flow of information from vertex
i to j, and E are all of the undirected edges between i and j; where i < j,∀(i, j) ∈ E.
This new objective function is subject to additional constraints involving new data that
includes a defense budget as well as a defense cost. For more information on how to
formulate the defender model, see [59].
Alderson et al. [66] reveal that the practice of defending a vertex also provides valuable
attack alternatives. By protecting or hardening a link in the optimal attack plan, the attacker
is able to develop multiple attack strategies. These plans are less optimal than the original
attack, but provide alternative options for decision makers to use in case the optimal attack
cannot be physically carried out or is too costly.
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6.3 Alternative Disruption Strategies
Our model focused on interdicting the shortest path from a source vertex to a set of
destination vertices. We used the knowledge of the communities to reduce the complexity
of our model in order to enhance the optimal solution time. In this section, we discuss
some additional ideas for using community properties to disrupt the network according to
shortest path interdiction and methods for measuring network resilience.
6.3.1 Community Isolation
Community isolation is another potential option for exploiting community properties for
disruption purposes. We recommend targeting the external edges of the communities with
demand vertices in order of increasing influence in the network. By this logic, we would
push the weaker communities away first, since they will require fewer external edge attacks.
To conduct this experiment, we recommend isolating each community for attack by only
leaving the isolated communities external edges available for attack. For each community,
record the number of external attacks required to fully isolate the community from the
network, as well as the total resultant cost damage to the network.
A modification of this option is to extend the concept of total influence to the the individual
vertex level. We can then target the vertices that are the most influential in the network. In
essence, this approach is similar to determining vertex centrality with respect to community
influence. Establishing the total influence of a vertex enhances our ability to identify the
key brokers in the network. targeting these brokers assists in the process of isolating the
communities they belong to from the rest of the network and consequently disrupts the flow
of information. This experimental idea can also be applied to the other dark networks as
well for additional trials and verification of results.
6.3.2 Optimal Community Size
In Chapter5, we examined only one subcase threshold, subcase 3.9. All of our threshold
cases need to be examined to determine if there is an optimal community size for applying
our strategy of collapsing communities that do not contain supply or demand vertices. If
the number of communities is too high, then we risk protecting edges from attack that
would normally provide the shortest path from supply to demand vertices. Conversely,
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if the number of communities is too low then collapsing the demand free communities
may not significantly decrease the solution evaluation time. Thus, an optimal community
size would reduce the complexity of the linear program while still determining an optimal
solution within an acceptable tolerance. We recommend testing the remaining thresholds
and comparing the results to the established community quality metrics.
Community size optimality will also depend on the nature of the attack model scenario.
For example, if one threshold subcase placed all of the demand vertices into one small
community, then all attack resources could be focused on isolating one community. How-
ever, if the defender objective was to deliver a message to every vertex in the network, then
an attacker strategy based on separating the network into multiple components might be
more appropriate. Many small size communities might be more beneficial for fracturing
the entire network. We can guide our attack based on the aforementioned community iso-
lation technique described in the previous subsection. Now that we have identified some
other methods for attacking the network, in the next subsection we discuss some additional
performance metrics for measuring the quality of the attack with respect to the resilience of
the network.
6.3.3 Network Resilience
Alderson et al. [66] recommends measuring the operational resilience, which is the adapt-
ability of the network to maintain functionality after attacks. Alderson et al. [67] propose
that one method to quantitatively measure operational resilience is to build the resilience
curve, which measures the post-attack cost growth as a function of the number of lost com-
ponents. This is similar to the parametric curves in Section 5.2, but also incorporates the
defender capabilities described in Section 6.2.2. Alderson et al. explains that the shape of
the parametric curve indicates the resilience of the network. Curves that begin with a steeper
slope and then gradually level (high elbow) represent less resilient networks. Conversely,
Alderson et al. points out that curves with a more gradual slope followed by a steep slope
(low elbow) after many attacks represent a more resistant system.
Bhatia et al. [68] discuss an alternative method for measuring network resilience using
percolation theory to define the State of Critical Functionality (SCF). They define Total
Functionality (TF) to be the number of demand vertices in the giant or largest component
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of the graph after zero attacks. They then record the Fragmented Functionality (FF), which
is the number of demand vertices that are still part of the giant component as a function






Bhatia et al. [68] explain that SCF values range between zero and one, with values closer to
one representing higher functionality and resilience for the network. Themetrics introduced
by Alderson et al. and Bhatia et al. for network resilience could be applied to our network
data sets to determine the adaptability of the networks to attack and defensive operations.
6.4 Conclusions
This thesis has presented an alternative method for conducting community detection in
multiplex networks. The algorithm was specifically tailored for dark network data sets, and
was tested on three data sets. However, the user engagement in our algorithm allows it to
be flexible for other networks. The thresholding option in our algorithm produces different
numbers of communities of different sizes according to the user’s purpose.
We noticed that the community quality generally increased with the size of the community.
The larger communities were developed under the provisions of the most relaxed threshold
values. The observation of threshold relaxation will most likely depend on the network, but
we do believe an optimal value does exist for most networks. However, optimality depends
on the goal the communities will be used for. Some networks have poor community
structure in general due to high connectivity amongst all vertices. In these cases, the graph
would prefer to remain one large community. The degree distribution may provide an
initial indicator on the potential for good quality communities, but the optimal number
of communities depends more specifically on the arrangement of the connectivity of the
data set. The speculation of the generality of our observations to other types of networks
provides a lot of potential for continuing this research.
The main purpose of our community development was to disrupt a terrorist network. With
this goal in mind, we formulated a community guided shortest path interdiction network
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flow model. Subcase 3.9 provided the necessary community compositions to guide the
shortest path interdiction model towards a faster solution, and it was the only subcase tested
for validation. More trials using other subcases may reveal a more optimal community
composition, but subcase 3.9 demonstrated the utility in reducing solution time by using
our community guided approach. Our focus on first defining a purpose for community
detection helped guide our algorithm development into a working procedure with tangible
results. We believe that detecting purpose-driven communities in multiplex networks by
thresholding user-engaged layer aggregation is a promising area of research that should be
continued and examined with more data sets in the future.
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